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ABSTRACT

Perspectives on the cultural obligations of higher education are presented in this collection of papers. Higher education's possible and probable cultural function is addressed from the perspective of business, the arts, education, and religion. Also discussed is the role of institutions of higher education in establishing a system of values, convictions, and attitudes. Included are the following: Tis All in Pieces, All Coherence Gone (Earl J. McGrath); Coherence and the Stream of Life (Joseph L. Marks); Higher Education and the Good Society (Alfred G. Hawkins); A Critique of "Higher Education and the Good Society" (Bette Everett Hamilton); Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: The Perspective of Man's Religious Heritage (Donald E. Heintschel); A Developmental View of Values and Ethics (Susan W. Cameron, John Y. Reid); The Fine Arts and Human Values in Higher Education (Roger Mandle); The Arts in Higher Education: An Approach for the Eighties (Elizabeth C. French). (SF)

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Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Views and Reviews

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COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO

2

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HIGHER EDUCATION'S CULTURAL OBLIGATIONS: VIEWS AND REVIEWS

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John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education
and the Division of Continuing Education,
The University of Toledo
in cooperation with
The Ohio Program in the Humanities

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword v

"'Tis All in Peeces, All Cohaerance Gone" 1
Earl J. McGrath

Coherence and the Stream of Life 11
Joseph L. Marks

Higher Education and the Good Society 19
Alfred G. Hawkins

A Critique of "Higher Education and the Good Society" 28
Bette Everett Hamilton

Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: The Perspective of Man's Religious Heritage 40
Donald E. Heintschel

A Developmental View of Values and Ethics 49
Susan W. Cameron
John Y. Reid

The Fine Arts and Human Values in Higher Education 59
Roger Mandle

The Arts in Higher Education: An Approach for the Eighties 67
Elizabeth C. French

FOREWORD

On April 26, 1979, the John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education and the Division of Continuing Education of The University of Toledo sponsored the conference "Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Four Perspectives," with support from The Ohio Program in the Humanities. Leaders from business, the arts, education, and religion presented their ideas concerning higher education's proper and possible cultural function and also addressed another, more specific issue: the role of institutions of higher learning in the establishment of some kind of system of values, convictions, and attitudes on the basis of which we can bring order out of what many perceive to be our current ethical chaos.

The conference featured a keynote address by Dr. Earl McGrath, former United States commissioner of education and current executive director of the Program in Liberal Studies at the University of Arizona. Other speakers were Mr. Alfred Hawkins, vice president for administration of the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company; Father Donald Heintschel, vicar for religious, executive coordinator of the Canon Law Society of America, and chairman of the Association of Catholic Learned Societies and Scholars; and Mr. Roger Mandle, director of The Toledo Museum of Art.

The papers presented by these four men are included in this monograph. Also included in the volume are four additional papers, commentaries written by higher education scholars.

The public meeting was an attempt to bring together people from different, and too frequently isolated, segments of society to discuss a complicated, important issue, namely, higher education's obligations to the culture, particularly in the area of values and ethics. Hopefully, this monograph will complement that first step.

John Y. Reid, Ph.D.
Director, John H. Russel Center
for the Study of Higher Education

'TIS ALL IN PEECES, ALL COHAERANCE GONE

Earl J. McGrath*

In colleges and universities today, the most commonly and often contentiously discussed topic is the question of values. The outcomes of these discussions will in large measure shape the future of American higher education and perhaps determine our destiny as a people. This statement may appear unseemly prophetic. Its validity is substantiated, however, not only by a growing company of qualified scholars, but also by journalists, commentators, and citizens generally, like Rene Dubos, Robert Heilbroner, Howard K. Smith, and Eric Sevareid. The talk and writings of many echo John Donne's observation, "'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone."

It is not surprising, therefore, that values heads the list of questions included in the program of this meeting. It reads, "Does higher education have a general cultural obligation to function as a social institution which helps provide citizens with a system of ethical and moral values on which they can rely?"

To avoid the suggestion of indoctrination, I would like to change the word *provide* to *assist* citizens in clarifying and embracing a system of values. With that alteration, I give an unqualifiedly affirmative answer to the question. Indeed, at this critical period in our national life, to the extent that a university does not undertake this crucial responsibility, it will fail to perform an indispensable public function. To the extent that it does not deal with values, it might fittingly be given a more limited name, such as an academic institute or research center. The Toledo community, academic and lay, ought to commend the John H. Russel Center and its director, John Reid, for hosting this conference of such timely importance.

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*Earl J. McGrath is the executive director of the Program in Liberal Studies at the University of Arizona.

In considering the responsibility of institutions of higher education to treat values, I would begin by citing the words of a noted American who viewed, analyzed, and evaluated our national life for over a half century. Speaking out of encyclopedic knowledge and ripe wisdom, Walter Lippmann, over a decade ago, addressed several hundred college and university administrators on the disarray in modern culture. With a sense of urgency he said the following on that occasion:

> One of the great phenomena of the human condition in the modern age is the dissolution of the ancestral order, the erosion of established authority, and having lost the light and the leading, the guidance and the support, the discipline that the ancestral order provided, modern men are haunted by a feeling of being lost and adrift, without purpose and meaning in the conduct of their lives. The thesis which I am putting to you is that the modern void, which results from the vast and intricate process of emancipation and rationalization, must be filled, and that the universities must fill the void because they alone can fill it.

The full context of his address justifies the inference that Lippmann was deeply concerned about the confusion in the moral, social, political, religious convictions, and in the practices which then characterized our way of life. To the academic community he was saying that its members had to provide the intellectual and moral cement which give unity and identity to a society. Lippmann did not indulge in the superfluous exercise of detailing the features which exemplified the accelerating cultural erosion. He assumed that such a knowledgeable audience would be able to identify for themselves the ubiquitous expressions of social disarray and the aimlessness of personal and social lives. Most importantly, like Rene Dubos and E. F. Schumacher, Lippmann was concerned about the loss of the sense of community on the local stage and on the broader theater of national and international life.

Today, Lippmann's observations apply with greater force. Since his talk, the processes of erosion have eaten more greedily into our cultural footings. There is no need to exhaustively catalog today's major problems, the mitigation of which can only be accomplished within a moral framework. The news media recite them almost hourly — inflation, energy shortage, crime, governmental ineptitude and corruption, the dissolution of marriage, hunger, pollution, racial discrimination, the uneven distribution of wealth, the inequitable treatment of women, and the decline in our moral and political position among the nations.

The value colorations of the choices which circumstances will force us to make are all too obvious. Most importantly, we need to revivify the basic tenet in our philosophy and practice of government, that the individual's decision will make a difference in the quality of life. The future of democratic institutions is jeopardized by the present feeling of futility so evident in the failure of recently enfranchised young persons to vote.

The cynicism among academics and other intellectuals should disturb those who care about preserving our heritage of free institutions. To achieve the changes in attitudes, policies, and practices in the academic enterprise which I have all too meagerly described will require unprecedented commitment on the part of the profession. Reform will also require a broader understanding and a deeper dedication on the part of laymen, especially those who will have been given the advantages of higher education. It will require a closer working relationship between members of the profession and the laity as represented in this audience. Serious conversations with a wide variety of citizens reveal few rejections of this analysis of our cultural derangement. Some, however, like a sociology professor at Berkeley, though in entire agreement with this diagnosis, doubt the practicability of reform. They believe that the social, economic, and political conditions of the academy, to say nothing of extra-mural vested interests in the status quo, are such that basic change may be very difficult. My reply to these doubters matches the position taken by John Gardner, former Secretary of H.E.W. and founder of Common Cause, in his recent book, *Morale.*

He totally rejects an attitude of futility. He believes firmly that the American people properly aroused through a presentation of the facts and stirred by rational argument will take the steps needed to restore order, commitment, and a sense of community in our culture. The alternatives, divisive conflict or apathetic inaction, can lead only to the fate of the other great cultures like those of Greece and Rome. We will first be overshadowed and then overcome by other peoples who through a vision of their rising place in history and a commitment to commonly accepted values, however at variance with our cultural tradition, are already on the move toward national fulfillment and international power.

The very fact that we are questioning whether an institution of higher education should concern itself with human values should be arresting. The fact is that with the exception of the ultra-conservative church-related colleges, values have in this century received waning consideration. Since the early nineteenth century under the increasingly dominant influence of the German university ideal, the various natural and social sciences have excluded value consideration on the ground that they distorted the empirical search for truth.

To achieve academic respectability, members even of departments of literature and philosophy have adopted positivistic and reductionistic interpretations of life. Moreover, some teachers of ethics, which by definition consists of a theory or system of moral values, have striven for scholarly status by concentrating on a pedantic and practically sterile review of the ethical theories of such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, and Dewey. The consideration of right and wrong, good and bad, evil and virtue, in terms of the personal and social issues of the day, have typically lacked the substance of reality. It is paradoxical that persons of intelligence and learning could fail to consider the value implications of their research and teaching. By their intellectual predilections they were, consciously or not, adopting the value system of scientific objectivism which by its dogmatic epistemology and metaphysics removes from scholarly activities the very stuff of personal and civic life.

Fortunately there are in the house of learning an increas-

ing number who recognize the limitations of recent pedagogical theory and practice. Max Lerner, with typical directness, in reviewing the current arguments about the place of values in education, remarks that is an idiotic debate, for as he observes, whether made explicit or not, the very substance of teaching in any discipline is freighted with value considerations. Abraham Maslow, once the brilliant president of the American Psychological Association, takes his professional associates to task for their failure to recognize the subjective peak experiences of life. He makes the observation:

> Most of the psychology on this positivistic, objectivistic, associationistic, value-free, value-neutral model of science as it piles up like a coral reef of small facts about this and that, is certainly not false, but merely trivial.

And Abraham Kaplan, once professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, speaking directly to teachers of philosophy, remarks:

> The gap is widening in our time between professional philosophers and the philosophies men live by. If what is important in life does not appear in professional work, or is brought in only to be negated, the work cannot have any place in the important contexts of life. Philosophy then becomes only an occupation, something incidental, while the life itself remains unexamined and thereby, as Socrates had it, not worth living. The gap between professed and lived philosophy makes action thoughtless and thought pointless.
>
> . . . When we turn away from the things that are important on the face of it, we are not necessarily approaching fundamental matters; it might simply be that we are coming to occupy ourselves with trivialities.

A host of scholars in other fields, of unimpeachable integrity and clearness of thought, could be cited to show that the question whether the university community has an obligation to treat the value implications in the teaching of the

various disciplines is now (to use a pun) an academic query. The question now is not *whether* but *how* should political, social, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual values be dealt with. They should be treated with the same openness and inclusiveness that characterize the study of all other aspects of human existence and of the physical universe.

Illustrations of the importance of value considerations can be abundantly found in all disciplines. In physics, for example, in view of the recent proof of the probability of fatal accidents, which the Union of Concerned Scientists have been foretelling for a long time, value decisions must be made in the matter of multiplying nuclear installations to produce energy. Scientists can no longer say what the social consequences may be is not our concern. The ethical issues, which were vigorously debated in the making and using of the Bomb, ought to be reconsidered by all those who study in our colleges and universities. In biology, because of the potential danger to humans, should we restrict the research on noncombinant DNA? In economics, ought we decrease the consumption of imported oil to reduce inflation? Do we wish to amend the constitution to assure women of equal human rights? As a people, through the political process, do we wish to assure the aged of a tolerable existence or alternatively expand the space program? I do not wish even to imply my own value decisions on these matters. What I am suggesting is that they involve problems and issues with which we as a people must deal. And as Howard K. Smith recently contended, scholars have in recent decades produced the basic knowledge needed to think constructively about all these issues. The last word may not now, or ever, be in, but it is not primarily ignorance that obstructs value decisions and inhibits public action. It is a lack of agreement on what choices are of most worth. The educational enterprise as a whole is the only agency qualified to correct the present deficiencies in our public, moral, and social illiteracy.

If values are to be given proper treatment, which faculty members and which departments have this responsibility? The easy curricular arrangement to dispose of the matter would be to assign the responsibility to teachers of ethics

and require all students to enroll. Perhaps the majority of their fellows in other disciplines would be quick to approve this plan. They could then feel they had no obligation to consider the value implications inherent in the facts and theories of their own subjects. This disposition of the problem involves several weaknesses. Without major revisions in the typical treatment of ethics as a separate specialized branch of learning, the common run of undergraduates would not be brought face to face with the value considerations implicit in matters treated in such subjects as economics, political science, psychology, history, art, physics, biology, and, indeed, in other subjects taught in professional schools of medicine, law, and engineering.

A second objection to placing responsibility in philosophy or any other single department rests on learning theory. Realism and meaning can best be brought to theoretical discussions of values by relating them to the particular substance of disciplines involved in the value decisions. In the concrete this means that discussions of the ethical considerations, the public decisions that, for example, have to be made with regard to DNA can be more effectively treated by a teacher of biology than by a philosopher or any other unrelated specialist.

And there is the related practical problem of the impossibility of any one scholar, however able and diligent, mastering the wide range of subject matter required to deal with the great variety of value-invested topics. The only practical arrangement to insure the competent, relevant, and realistic treatment of values is to deal with them not as aspects of learning abstracted from the main body of instruction, but rather as inseparable aspects of complex life situations.

In view of academic trends of this century, this total involvement of the academy in preparing students to make value choices individually and collectively will not be easily accomplished. In fact, some leaders have already declared that to instruct students in making decisions involving ethics, morals, and values will undermine both institutional integrity

and freedom of teaching. This position rests on false premises. To contend that to discuss even the most ardently held value systems implies indoctrination or prejudicial treatment is a *non sequitur*. Indeed, not to present the varied and sometimes sharply conflicting opinions is to subvert the whole teaching process and to abuse the privileges of academic freedom. This view raises shades of the McCarthy era when even the most adverse discussion of communism was considered culpable. Only the presentation of the controversial problems and issues of our day will prepare our people to choose those alternative courses of action, public and private, essential to our personal well-being and our national welfare. To live is to choose among alternatives. In terms of social consequences, not to choose knowledgeably and freely is nevertheless equivalent to making a choice, or in the long run, to concede the responsibility to others. This alternative in the end leads to dictatorship and all the evils this type of social organization inevitably entails. The unqualified answer to the question posed in our conference program is 'Yes, higher education does have a cultural obligation to function as a social institution which assists citizens in clarifying and embracing a system of values."

The related subject I wish to address for a moment has to do with the general education of all students regardless of their special intellectual interests or their occupational preferences.

The recognition of the need to provide a more adequate general education for our people generally is attested by the fact that many faculties are trying to devise new programs of studies to serve this purpose. Unfortunately with uncommon exception, these efforts, like their predecessors in the forties, will be abortive. Failure in these efforts has always stemmed principally from the fact that those who design general courses begin with fixed ideas regarding the internal worth of various kinds of knowledge, as seen by the advocates of the several disciplines. This predisposition produces course structures composed of unrelated teaching units. Primary attention is given to the logical development of subject matter leading to more advanced specialized study. The

concrete results of these efforts, because of their fragmentation, were only minimally useful in broadening the student's intellectual experience. It should be conceded, therefore, that earlier similar innovations in general education after a promising beginning were largely abandoned, even by their original advocates.

To avoid fragmentation and superficiality, faculties now are typically reverting to the distribution system which prevailed widely early in this century to correct the narrowing results of free election. This approach is the most acceptable to faculties because it preserves the primacy of their specialized courses. It also eliminates the disturbing necessity of making a fundamental assessment of the larger purposes of higher education, the consequences of which would inevitably entail the redesigning of instruction in terms of the functions of an informed citizenry in a free society.

If another attempt to provide a proper general education is to be any more successful then its predecessor of several decades ago, those who design it will have to begin with a completely different set of presuppositions. First, it must be assumed that higher education has a more inclusive set of social purposes than are now operable in curricular construction. The preparation of future scholars in a narrow area of a discipline is admittedly an essential function of *undergraduate programs* of study, but this activity can constitute a relatively small part of a normal faculty work load. Regardless of their specialized intellectual interests or their vocational goals, the majority of students should be taking courses which provide the knowledge and cultivate the intellectual skills essential to living an informed and intelligent life.

Second, the instructional units in a general education program must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the student's widest possible understanding of the problems and issues he will encounter in the usual activities of living in the world of his day. Hence, the constituent subject matter will be chosen not in terms of the faculty member's particular specialized interests, his professional ambitions,

or his status in the academic society, but rather in terms of its functional significance in the student's understanding of himself and the world in which he lives.

Third, since the chief purpose of general education is the understanding of complex problems, instructional material must be drawn from a number of related disciplines. Problems in the physical, social, and individual world may need to be divided up into units of reality for purposes of objective analysis of the various forces, but if general education is to be useful to the ordinary citizen all relevant factors ought to be meaningfully reassembled. Moreover, these materials must be so integrated as to give the student a realistic view of the complex situations he will encounter in his family, his community, and in the complex physical world. The kind of course popular in the forties in which the units of instruction often had unifying relationships only in the course title will have to be replaced by those in which units of instruction are not only interrelated among themselves, but also joined by their relevance to complex real life situations. This restructuring of the subject with the primary undergraduate goals in the forefront of planners with an emphasis on values and general education will better prepare our people for the complex life they will face in the days ahead. Our citizens can properly ask academic institutions to take this moral responsibility.

COHERENCE AND THE STREAM OF LIFE

Joseph L. Marks*

In his address "'Tis All in Peeces, All Cohaerance Gone," Dr. Earl J. McGrath presents his case for the proposition that "higher education has a general cultural obligation to function as a social institution which helps assist citizens in clarifying and embracing a system of values."[1] However, in the process of presenting his case, the proposition becomes transformed into a stronger thesis:

> The educational enterprise as a whole is the only agency qualified to correct the present deficiencies in our public, moral, and social illiteracy.[2]

This thesis will be termed the Sole Responsibility Thesis. It will be argued that McGrath's shift from the Some Responsibility Thesis to the Sole Responsibility Thesis is unfortunate. It is unfortunate because the former appears to be adequately supported, whereas the latter is not. Furthermore, the Some Responsibility Thesis is inherently more supportable.

There are some ambiguities which must be addressed in order to prepare a clear explication of McGrath's position for discussion. McGrath cites Lippman's version of the Sole Responsibility Thesis: "The modern void . . . must be filled . . . [by] the universities . . . because they alone can fill it.[3] He gives his assent by saying, "Today Lippman's observations apply with greater force."[4] Since McGrath's version of the Sole Responsibility Thesis speaks of "the educational enterprise as a whole," and yet he assents to Lippman's version which speaks of universities specifically, it is not clear whether McGrath intends the Sole Responsibility Thesis to hold for education as a whole or for universities. In the absence of other textual cues, this author will take one

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17

from the context of the address. Since the conference in which the address was made concerned the role of higher education in value oriented education, it will be assumed that McGrath intended the Sole Responsibility Thesis to apply to higher education, not the educational enterprise as a whole. This assumption is a compromise in that it posits a broader application than asserted by Lippman and a narrower application than asserted by McGrath.

One further clarification is called for. In stating his version of the Sole Responsibility Thesis, McGrath characterizes the social deficiency that higher education should remedy as a "public, moral, and social illiteracy" (termed here "civic illiteracy"). But when presenting Lippman's version of the Sole Responsibility Thesis, McGrath characterizes the social deficiency as a pervasive social malaise involving "confusion in moral, social, political, religious convictions," "social disarray and . . . aimlessness of personal and social lives," and a "loss of the sense of community. . . ."[5] It is not clear what the relationship between these two characterizations is. Is the civic illiteracy a part of the social malaise or is the social malaise a symptom of civic illiteracy? If civic illiteracy were part of the malaise, it would have been more logical for McGrath to have identified the malaise as the key ailment higher education should strive to remedy. Thus the charitable interpretation of this ambiguity is that McGrath views the pervasive social malaise to be a symptom of illiteracy regarding civic life. This interpretation is more plausible when it is noted that curing civic illiteracy is *prima facie* a more appropriate objective for higher education than the reduction of general social malaise.

McGrath's argument for the Sole Responsibility Thesis is made along the following lines. During the course of this century, social malaise has increased, while at the same time values have been given less and less consideration in higher education. The influences of the German university ideal, positivism, and a value neutral view of scholarship have been responsible for the erosion of value oriented considerations in higher education. But McGrath agrees with perceptive observers such as Lerner, Maslow, and Kaplan, who have

shown that higher education cannot escape value issues: "The question now is not *whether* but *how* should political, social, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual values be dealt with."[3]

Before discussing what McGrath has to say about how higher education can effectively deal with value oriented issues, the following question must be addressed: Has the Sole Responsibility Thesis been adequately supported, or is it the weaker Some Responsibility Thesis which has, in fact, been established?

In order to establish the Sole Responsibility Thesis, one would have to demonstrate that other major social institutions cannot have a significant influence upon civic illiteracy and social malaise. In fact, however, a case can be made for the opposite proposition—that other major social institutions can have a significant influence. Furthermore, it would need to be established that eliminating civic illiteracy would alleviate social malaise. Neither of these needed propositions has been confronted by McGrath in his address, nor are either very compelling.

History and daily experience offer many instances which counter the claim that civic literacy is a necessary and sufficient condition for a healthy moral climate (the opposite of pervasive social malaise). Perversity and evil are not ruled out by moral literacy. It is all too possible for there to be individuals who are fully cognizant of the dehumanizing consequences of their acts and yet who persist in them. Some racists provide good examples of people of this type. It is also possible for someone not literate or articulate in civic matters to be a most upright person. Thus it may be that civic literacy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for a healthy moral climate.

To become articulate in civic matters requires more than attaining verbal skill; in a formal, school situation, such an articulateness requires a familiarity with, and sophistication about, the concepts and realities of civic life. This familiarity and sophistication grows out of experience in the civic world not just out of a cognitive pursuit. Thus an individual's character building experiences become a vital foundation for

civic articulateness. This conclusion is more evident when one notes that character building experiences are those experiences an individual has in life which acquaint the individual with the subtle interplay of human interaction, with the consequences and implications of others' acts, and with the consequences and implications of one's acts toward others.

There is a saying attributed to Goethe that will help create a connection between character building experiences, civic inarticulateness, and broader social responsibility for the condition of our culture: "Genius develops in quiet places,/Character out in the full current of human life."[7]

Higher education, while being a place of social interaction and a part of society, appears to be primarily an enclave for the development of talent or genius. The academy is a place that nurtures the solitary labor that bears cognitive fruit. This characterization of higher education is expressed well by W. K. Goosens when he argues that the aim of teaching philosophy is to "teach a certain form of productive creativity."[8] When we add to the above characterization of higher education the contention that life experiences within higher education are not in the mainstream or "full current of human life," then the case being built begins to take shape.

Nils Christie, in a recent article entitled "The Outsiders," reemphasizes the sociological theme that education functions to prolong the period of youth, to insure necessary training, and to control the size of the labor force.[9] It seems plausible to assert that to the extent education serves this "shelving" function, it removes people from the primary socioeconomic currents. The result is a reduction in opportunities for character building experiences. It might be said that a society with such an educational system suffers from a maldistribution of experiences vital to the maintenance of civic responsibility. Furthermore, since the vicarious, intellectual experiences of study need a "real life" experience base, the great ideas can have only a marginal impact (they remain "just ideas") for those without the experience and perceptiveness to enliven them. In our society, the odds are

against native perceptiveness conquering the obstacles in the way of character building experiences that prolonged "studentship" brings. If we need people to face the world, to develop civic articulateness based on character building experiences, and to develop an ethical maturity worthy of our human status and the challenges of our age, then a fuller immersion of people in the economic, political, and religious institutions of society is called for. Higher education can then contribute to enriching our way of life and to fostering contemplation of the good life.

At this point, a case has been made for the proposition that major influences other than those which occur in higher education institutions can have a significant impact upon the development of civic literacy. Indeed, other influences appear to provide an essential base upon which higher education's contribution can be built. This conclusion and the conclusion that removing civic illiteracy does not necessarily remove social malaise indicate that the Sole Responsibility Thesis has not been justified. However, the Some Responsibility Thesis has been supported.

Given the supportability of the Some Responsibility Thesis, it is important to discuss how higher education should meet this responsibility. In this regard, there are some hopeful signs that social conditions conducive to alleviating social malaise and civic illiteracy may be developing. Should these conditions indeed develop, then a platform from which higher education could better make its contribution would exist.

Three forces appear to be coming together that may produce a decline in the physical and social mobility in our society. The three forces are energy shortages, reduced economic growth and inflation, and higher participation rates in the labor force, which results in increased competition for good jobs. If these trends do promote reduced mobility, then pressures to strengthen the sense of community should emerge. As people stay in the same location and jobs longer, and retain the same social reference group longer, they will tend to become more concerned about the quality of life in their communities. Since people will be less able to "tune out"

discomforts and community problems by escaping them, they will tend to become more involved in the life of their reference groups, work places, and communities and to take more civic responsibility for them.

Reduced physical mobility may also make something like the residential student experience regain a central educational role. The case for the proposition that the residential student experience promotes civic literacy more than the commuter student experience has been championed widely by Alexander Astin and others.[10]

Additionally, reduced economic growth is likely to stimulate what might be called cultural productivity. With fewer financial resources available for commercialized entertainments and aimless consumerism, individuals will be forced in the direction of falling back on their own personal and collective resources. Out of this may emerge a revival of a spirit of cultural enhancement.

Another hopeful sign is that the average age of higher education students is likely to increase in the future. This is hopeful in that older students often have had a wider variety of character building experiences than students in the traditional 18-22-year-old cohort.

A final set of developments must be mentioned in the category of "hopeful signs." This set is admitted reluctantly since these developments are usually seen as having a negative influence on the functioning and progressive development of higher education. The set of developments involves the growing interdependence among business, industry, government, and institutions of higher learning. This is a characteristic of our highly technological society and is usually decried for threatening the autonomy and academic freedom of institutions of higher education. But in the context of this discussion, the ever closer relationships between these major social institutions have a positive feature. To the extent that higher education is "compromised" by its dealing with business, industry, and government, it becomes immersed more fully in the central social activities vital to the function-

ing of our society. This puts higher education more in the mainstream of our social life. As a result, it might be the case that while academic transactions are "corrupted" to a degree, essential social transactions will be positively transformed. Such complementary results might have the beneficial consequence of increasing the sense of social responsibility of those involved in academic work and hence promote increased levels of character building experiences for students.

McGrath's view of how higher education should meet its responsibilities reflects the notion of increasing interrelatedness, among institutions and in society as a whole:

> The only practical arrangement to insure the competent, relevant, and realistic treatment of values is to deal with them not as aspects of learning abstracted from the main body of instruction, but rather as inseparable aspects of complex life situations.[11]

McGrath suggests that the currently fragmented curriculum and fragmented academic pursuits must be infused with an interdisciplinary spirit. Certain activities are essential parts of such a process. First, the representatives of the disciplines must sort out the complex interrelations between subjects and the "real world." Then they must organize the curriculum in ways that make the interrelations transparent to students who otherwise would get lost in the forest of detailed subject matter. McGrath states:

> Instructional units in a general education program must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to the student's widest possible understanding of the usual activities of living in the world of his day . . . not in terms of the faculty members' particular specialized interests. . . .[12]

Without taking issue with the claim that curricular reform along the lines McGrath indicates would be helpful, one can reasonably take issue with the extremity of his

position. The first reason is that McGrath's prescription requires faculty and other curriculum planners to have superhuman abilities. Any of us is lucky to be able to approximate a vision of our own future and to be able to structure our cognitive apparatus to deal with the problems and issues we encounter; it appears to be asking too much to demand that the higher education community can achieve such a cognitive structuring for a younger, or parallel, generation. It also seems a bit patronizing and presumptuous. Our knowledge *is* fragmented. The splintered curriculum accurately reflects this fragmentation.

In summary, this author concurs with Dr. McGrath that the case for the Some Responsibility Thesis is compelling. Support has been found for the position that higher education does have a special role and a special contribution to make; but higher education's concerns and reform efforts must be placed in proper perspective. Support has been found for the position that higher education does not have an exclusive responsibility; and it is a delusion to think that even the very best higher education can have miraculous effects.

NOTES

1Earl J. McGrath, "'Tis All in Peeces, All Cohaerance Gone," in *Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Views and Reviews*, ed. John Y. Reid (Toledo, Ohio: John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education, The University of Toledo, 1980), p. 1.

2McGrath, p. 6.

3McGrath, p. 2.

4McGrath, p. 3.

5McGrath, p. 2.

6McGrath, p. 6.

7*The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 224.

8W. K. Goosens, "What Philosphy Tries to Teach," *Teaching Philosophy* 1, no. 1 (1975):5.

9Nils Christie, "The Outsiders," *Scandinavian Review* 2 (1979): 6-11.

10Alexander W. Astin, "On the Failures of Educational Policy," *Change* 8, no. 9 (1976):25-30.

11McGrath, p. 7.

12McGrath, p. 9.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

Alfred G. Hawkins*

I am delighted to take part in this conference, although I must confess that I have been apprehensive about it. I suspect that my fellow speakers have more experience than I with the subject under discussion. My own understanding of the state university and its aims and purposes tends to be pragmatic and reflects my personal and business experience. I did have the good fortune to attend several universities and to take what was largely a liberal arts program. I have also been called upon to help public school systems and universities with special problems which usually did not include evaluation of the curricula or purposes of the schools. Finally, I have had a parent's interest in higher education; two of my sons earned degrees last year. One of them received a doctorate in communications and prepared a dissertation which I am still trying to understand!

I do feel that this is an important and timely conference, and I will attempt to offer the perspective of a business person. I would like to point out that my opinions are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of others in business or of the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company. The business community does not have one mind on the subject of higher education. We obviously think well of the state university, and we hire its graduates. But we have mixed opinions about the role of the university in educating the individual and shaping society.

I will begin my remarks by stating that, in my opinion, higher education does have a cultural obligation to help citizens understand ethical and moral values. This is apparently why higher education came into being, if we go all the way back to the universities of the Renaissance period or even further back to Plato. Higher education had its beginnings in studies which were dominated by questions about

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the meaning and purpose of life, the search for Truth, and the study of literature, history, and language.

It was only later that universities also became training schools for doctors, lawyers, and teachers. I suppose this was how career education was first introduced to the university, but it was never thought that colleges would someday be offering degrees in such major fields as advertising, hotel management, or even business administration. In fact, the older generations of Americans were not really convinced that higher education was good for everybody. When I started my own business career, for example, I worked under older men who resented the college-trained person and thought that practical job experience was the best education of all. It was not until after World War II that college training finally received full acceptance in business and industry.

It's probably not necessary to point out that this change has been very good for the growth of the state university. Thirty years ago, we had just over two and one-half million people in college, with enrollments about evenly divided between public and private schools. Today, we have about four times that number in college, but it is the public sector that has grown the most. More than three-fourths of all American college students are in state schools, and we can expect this percentage to grow as private schools close down or accept some kind of public affiliation.

But this growth in higher education has not been in the traditional liberal arts fields. I recently looked over a breakdown of the enrollment here at The University of Toledo and concluded that at least ninety percent of our students are in career education programs of different kinds. I suspect that the same percentage would be true of any state university in the land. And as a businessman who sometimes dabbles in politics, I can understand how this happened. The people, acting both as parents and voters, support the idea of career education for their children and want the state university to provide it at relatively low cost to the student. I'm sure that the administrations of our state universities here in Ohio are well aware of this political fact of life and

use it to great advantage in obtaining state and federal funds.

It is not a defense or an endorsement of career education to say that it has broad public support, but it seems to me that the public nature of the state is something to keep in mind in any discussion of its aims and purposes. The state university also has an unusual responsibility in adopting any program dealing with personal and social values. I think it would be difficult, if not wrong, for the state university to take an advocacy position regarding certain values that are currently undergoing change. In fact, university professors frequently remind us of this fact when we complain about anti-business bias on the campus. We are told that the university has the responsibility to give all points of view and all value systems a fair hearing. This is not only fair but is well in line with the state university's mandate to serve the people.

Even as a publicly-supported institution, however, the state university has considerable latitude and discretionary power in its operations. I think there are several ways in which it can be very effective in helping students and the public in the search for reliable values. The first suggestion is that career education and liberal arts studies should be brought more closely together, even if it means leaping over a few departmental fences. Another suggestion is that providing adult education should become a major part of the university's purpose. Finally, the university is already well-positioned to enlarge its work of providing and sponsoring forums for the understanding of values.

My first suggestion is that career education and liberal arts studies should be merged in some imaginative way that will give us the best of both worlds without sacrificing the essentials in either program. In my opinion, it would be completely impossible and perhaps undesirable to make the changes in curriculum that some groups are advocating. We are frequently told, for example, that career education consists of training students for vocations that soon may become obsolete, while pure liberal arts programs will help people use their minds for the total life experience. The career per-

son learns how to do something, we are told, but he doesn't really know much about the larger picture or the real meaning of life. The liberal arts student, on the other hand, has learned something about values and has shared the thinking of the world's great philosophers, poets, and writers. The people in one camp tell us that we should scrap most of our liberal arts programs; others tell us that liberal arts studies are the only true education and that business and government have conspired to turn the universities into trade schools.

It seems to me that either group would have a difficult time proving its case. It would probably be easy to prove that career-educated people usually find advantages in the job market, but this may be the result of hiring policies and the fact that business firms and government organizations actively recruit career-trained people. One of our personnel directors believes that liberal arts graduates are usually well ahead of career people in verbal skills and general knowledge areas. But this probably proves only that liberal arts students are also people who read a lot and have a good deal of curiosity; it does not follow that everybody would do equally well in verbal skills and general knowledge if he had a liberal arts education.

However, few people go through college without receiving a selected number of liberal arts courses. In fact, when you consider the magnitude of present college enrollments, it's quite possible that more people are getting some liberal arts education than ever before. If this education is not making an impact, perhaps something should be done to make it more relevant for students in career curricula.

Here's one way it might be done. Every state university has basic courses in ethics and philosophy which deal with these subjects in an abstract, somewhat theoretical way; and every profession is deeply concerned about ethics questions. Similarly, most business and professional associations are trying to develop suitable ethics codes for all their members. This should be a golden opportunity to show the student that ethics and philosophy will have a bearing on his life's

work as well as the very survival of society. The coursework should also be structured so that the basic ethics study and specific ethics programs are a continuum and not just isolated parts of a required course of study.

I'm well aware of the fact that it's difficult to make changes in curricula, but universities can be very innovative when they're not held back by custom or tradition. I am thinking of the senior management education programs pioneered by Harvard and now sponsored by many schools. These programs tend to be broad rather than specific, and they are structured to introduce the individual to important ideas and concepts that relate to his own work and to the larger problems of life. I might add that the traditional liberal arts subjects are key elements in those programs. There is very little emphasis on skills and vocational know-how; a great deal more emphasis is placed on general ideas and problem-solving. These are graduate level programs, of course, and might not fit the needs of much younger people enrolled in undergraduate programs, but I do like their approach and their method of offering a fairly integrated educational package.

My next point is that the universities should make adult education in the liberal arts a major part of their mission. We are already moving in that direction. It is not unusual to find people in their fifties working towards undergraduate degrees, and the graduate programs are filled with individuals in the twenty-six to forty group. We are getting used to the idea that higher education might be too important to be left to young people.

It seems to me that older people might be the best candidates for liberal arts education. For one thing, most of them may already have their life's work underway, so they don't feel under pressure to acquire training and credentials. More important, adult students have experience that serves as a background in liberal arts education. They might be more interested in education for its own sake rather than as a means to an end.

I also feel that enrolling older students in the univer-

sity is a practical way to keep society in touch with higher education. There was a time when the college was set apart as a sort of cloistered world which we had created for young people, but that began to change after the World War II G.I. Bill of Rights brought older people back to the campus. Now we take it for granted that middle-aged people can return as students and be fully accepted as part of the university. Today, adult students also have the benefits of employee education programs and state and federal grants in returning to school. This helps provide the financial support for adult education; the university can do the rest by recognizing adult education as a major part of its purpose.

The third suggestion I have is that the university should continue to increase its work of providing special forums for the study and discussion of values. This conference is an example of such a forum. In my opinion, the university is the best setting for this kind of discussion. It is very difficult for private organizations and groups to sponsor discussions that prove to be fair to all groups and to all value systems. Most organizations have an axe to grind or some special program to defend, but the university is supposed to be devoted to a search for truth and knowledge.

In sponsoring forums for the understanding of values, the state university has a public responsibility to be fair. This university is supported by all the people, including members of groups who feel that their own deeply held values and convictions are under heavy attack today. The public schools have often been accused of sponsoring values and ideas which some people feel are offensive and harmful. The university can avoid this criticism by making its forums as all-inclusive and impartial as possible. I think most people and groups want the university to sponsor this kind of service. They do want to be assured, however, that their own values and ideas will get fair representation.

I do have some personal concerns about this matter of fairness to all groups. We all know that there are deep divisions in society about ethical and moral values. We are crying for answers, and yet the state university doesn't have

the final answers. It is not positioned to sponsor any value system to the exclusion of other systems. It cannot sponsor ethical and moral values in the same way that a privately-controlled institution is permitted to sponsor such values. For example, I cannot believe that it would be proper for The University of Toledo to present ethical and moral values in the way that such values were given to me by Jesuit teachers.

My teachers had definite ideas about right and wrong, and they taught with a great deal of authority and conviction. They believed in a Supreme Being who had established a system based on reward and retribution. Part of the teaching was based on being rewarded for virtuous actions and being punished for sinful deeds. I now think that the fear of punishment was a major factor in this teaching. The Jesuits gave me reason to be concerned about the Hereafter, and to make sure that I listened, they also instilled some fear of the Here and Now. I remember that we had a lot of respect for authority. This was almost part of the air we breathed.

Like most church-related teachers, my professors had a point of view which was emphasized almost exclusively. Our values were right and good, and other values were either wrong or somewhat inferior. This absolutist viewpoint is not limited to the Jesuits. I am sure that such schools as Brigham Young University, Wheaton College, and Valparaiso University are strong defenders of their respective religious values. They have a right to do this under the First Amendment, and since the schools receive limited public support, the rest of us are not involved.

State universities are of a different order. Like the public schools, they must satisfy virtually every constituency in society. The more specific and positive a public school becomes about values, the more vulnerable it becomes to attacks and reprisals from groups who feel that their own values are being slighted. For example, some conservative religious groups have become so unhappy with the public high schools that they've started schools of their own. When

you look into the cause of their grievances, they largely involve morals and values; they feel strongly that the public schools have become a threat to their own cherished values. They believe that public schools teach values simply by choosing certain textbooks or by permitting students to defy authority.

The state university has also been accused of the same things, but so far it has been able to retain the public's approval and support. One reason for this public support, as I stated earlier, has been the emphasis on career education. Whatever its shortcomings, career education has public acceptance and has opened up the public purse strings in Columbus and Washington, D.C. I am in sympathy with the people who think that career education has been overemphasized, but if I were in President Driscoll's* chair, I would be forced to consider a number of political and economic realities in setting policy for the school. I would have to conclude, I think, that we are very successful as a school offering pharmacy, law, teacher training, business, and engineering. I would no more think of dropping those programs than I would consider dropping football if I were president of Notre Dame.

I do think, however, that the state university can find new paths to travel without destroying its base as a public institution. The public has strongly supported career education, but it has not insisted on the exclusion of liberal arts and the humanities. In fact, almost every career program has one or more years of liberal arts courses. We need to demonstrate the importance of this and to relate it more closely to society's problems and the world of work.

What I've tried to suggest, as an interested outsider, are three ways this might be done within the existing framework. One path is to prepare new undergraduate curricula that students and parents will accept as a complete and necessary package. All of a student's coursework should be perceived as relevant and necessary; otherwise, it's a waste of everybody's time and money. Does the student really

*President of The University of Toledo

grow and learn how to think by taking courses that he does not value? We do not settle the issue by making certain courses compulsory. We will do better if we learn how to motivate students in the process.

The second path is the new field now opening in adult education. This may actually change the basic form of the university. We are now beginning to accept the idea that education is never really completed. It should be ongoing and benefit everybody. The adults who are returning to school might be the best students for courses and seminars dealing with ethical and moral values. Most of us in business try to keep ourselves informed and up-to-date by reading and attending *ad hoc* meetings, but the university still has the best tools and atmosphere for learning.

Finally, the way is also clear to make the university even more effective in sponsoring seminars and meetings dealing with values. This is something that the university already does in a limited way, but the work can be enlarged and improved. The public will support this activity and will continue to support it if such work is carried on in the right spirit. This should not be difficult. After all, the university is supposed to be devoted to a search for truth, for higher values, for fairness in all things. Most of us who are concerned about values and society would like to have the university become a principal forum for this kind of education.

I hope that the people who lead this effort have the humility that is supposed to be characteristic of true scholars. My Jesuit teachers were often sure that they were right about moral issues; yet they also had a deep humility that I have always remembered. They looked upon their value system as a life-and-death matter, as something that also affected one's hope of Eternal Life. We should give ethical and moral values the same importance. We will have to live with the values that become predominant in society. Let's make sure that the search for higher values is thorough, fair, and also relevant.

A CRITIQUE OF "HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY"

Bette Everett Hamilton*

In his speech "Higher Education and the Good Society,"[1] Mr. A. G. Hawkins, senior vice president of administration of the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company, suggests three major programs that the state university might develop to better meet the educational needs of the public and to help citizens understand ethical and moral values. The state university should (1) bring career education and the liberal arts more closely together; (2) promote adult education in the liberal arts as a major part of the University's purposes; and (3) enlarge its work of providing and sponsoring forums for the study and discussion of values.

As a representative of the "industry of higher education," I am involved with interpreting academe's priorities, problems, and customs to the U.S. Congress, a body made up of people from business, like Mr. Hawkins, from labor, and from various other segments of the American public. These people often ask me about the evolved purposes of higher education, and more importantly where it is heading. I will try to integrate Mr. Hawkins' ideas with the realities that confront me daily as a lobbyist for higher education, and I will focus on some alternatives available over the next decade.

BRINGING CAREER EDUCATION AND LIBERAL ARTS MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER

Mr. Hawkins suggests that publicly funded institutions (he uses the term *state university*) must keep the "public nature of the state . . . in mind in any discussion of their aims and purposes." He implies that career education programs are more politically palatable and that it is easier to make the case for funding them than it is to make the case for liberal arts programs, which are apparently non-related

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to the future career goals of the students. He argues, however, that the liberal arts courses are perceived as the critical foundation of an education that promotes creative thinking, decision making, and the acquisition of verbal skills and that as such they are a necessary part of a college education. Mr. Hawkins would integrate education oriented toward a specific career with the fundamentals of liberal arts education, which relate important ideas and concepts to one's work and to larger problems of life. To make an analogy with the debate over the virtues of basic vs. applied research, Mr. Hawkins would have us use some of the "truths" discovered in basic research to enhance our own applied research. Mr. Hawkins' point of view has been joined by many other prominent Americans who have reflected on necessary educational changes.

The U.S. Congress has similarly begun to debate the future of higher education, particularly its relationship to the workplace and the federal programs that might stimulate innovation and quality education. At hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education held on August 10, 1979, in Burlington, Vermont, Dr. John Eurich of Goddard College and Dr. Myrna Miller of the Community College of Vermont told the members of Congress that if higher education were to meet the educational needs of the fast emerging adult student population, the curricular content as well as the teaching process would have to be altered. Members of Congress were surprised and sought clarification. Did Drs. Eurich and Miller mean that the traditional college courses and subjects taught to 18-22-year-olds were improper and/or nonrelevant for older adults? Drs. Eurich and Miller alleged that the traditional liberal arts courses were also improper and nonrelevant for 18-22-year-olds; but they pointed out that, unlike most members of the traditional college-age cohort, older consumers were not captive audiences and were more vocal in their demands for relevancy, especially the application of important ideas and concepts to their own lives.[2] Older students, after all, come to higher education with a wealth of experiences; 18-22-year-olds, on the other hand, more often learn the theory before they have an opportunity to apply their learning in practice.

The Committee on Human Resources of the U.S. Senate likewise has been concerned with the appropriateness of the college curriculum and held two days of hearings, June 6 and 7, 1979, on the future of higher education and its relationship to the workplace. On that occasion, W. Frank Blount, assistant vice president of training and education for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, offered a useful distinction between "training" and "education" and made a suggestion that most educators confuse the acquisition of basic learning skills with a student's taking the traditional liberal arts curriculum. Mr. Blount argued that training is learning aimed at helping individuals learn specific work-related tasks or job information; education, on the other hand, is learning designed to provide general knowledge skills and attitudes for "living in today's world and coping with a wide range of information and situations."[3] Mr. Blount stated that most employers, certainly the Bell System, would assume the responsibility for job training, especially in specific technical areas, but that it remained the responsibility for the educational system, in particular higher education, to teach the fundamental skills that require a long period of development and reinforcement. In addition to the basic skills associated with reading, writing, and speaking, Mr. Blount added analytic thinking, problem solving, and decision making. He stated, "Nor is it too much to expect that college graduates come into the world of work with some conception of what working is all about."[4] Certainly Mr. Blount would agree with Mr. Hawkins that college curricula should be better integrated in the hope that skill acquisition — including analytical thinking and problem solving — would be a major part of curricula, even for career-oriented majors.

Dr. Jerome M. Ziegler of Cornell University, another witness at the Senate hearings on "The Workplace and Higher Education: Perspectives in the Coming Decade," was of a similar mind to Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Blount. Dr. Ziegler told the senators the following:

> The chief curricular problem for institutions of higher education in the next decade is to combine general or liberal education with preparation for

work and to include at some point in the curriculum an adequate work experience. . . . From my perspective, the value lies in bringing to the campus classroom the impact of conditions in the world outside the campus gates. That impact forces the faculty and the students to consider the interrelationship of theoretical knowledge and learning with the conditions and problems human beings face regularly in their everyday lives. Thus, knowledge and learning are placed at the service of solving problems and improving the lives of all of us.[5]

ADULT EDUCATION AS A MAJOR PART OF THE UNIVERSITY'S PURPOSE

Mr. Hawkins is once again on target when he suggests the university shall promote adult education in the liberal arts as a major part of its mission. In fact, when one considers the dramatic demographic shifts that have already begun to have an impact on colleges and universities, and which should intensify and continue at least to the year 2000, marketing higher education for adults becomes important indeed. According to researchers at Duke University, the traditional college-age population, the 18-24-year-old cohort, will peak in 1981.

It will then decline at least through 1996. This cohort grew by 53 percent in the 1960's (from 16.1 million in 1960 to 24.7 million in 1970), and it will grow by another 19 percent by the end of this decade (to 29.5 million in 1980). Then, however, the trend will reverse. During the 1980's, the 18-24-year-old cohort will shrink by 15 percent (to 25.1 million in 1990).[6]

Robert D. Behn of Duke University states:

> The shrinkage in the traditional market for a college education does not necessarily mean that enrollments must decline, or that colleges and universities must close. Institutions of higher education could attract a greater percentage of students from the traditional age group (with new,

rewarding or more career-oriented programs) or recruit older students (who seek part-time, mid-career or recreational education). If not, however, some of these institutions must face shrinkage or extinction. Either way, the demographic realities are that higher education will be much different in the 1980's than it was in the 1970's, let alone the 1960's.[7]

Adult students have already begun to have an impact on higher education, with their heaviest enrollment in the community and junior college sector and in urban universities with large extension departments. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, in the spring of 1975 only 51 percent of the total college enrollment (5,032,000) were dependent 18-24-year-old children; over 44 percent (4,319,000) of the total college enrollment by 1975 were already independently supported heads of households or their spouses (See Figure I).

What is most significant about the demographic shift in enrollments and their projection over the next two decades is that different sectors of postsecondary education (i.e., private, public, two-year, four-year) are affected differently. In addition, the enrollment rate of traditional college-age white men has declined since the termination of the draft and the lessening economic value of a college credential; the enrollment rate of minority individuals (both men and women) has peaked and stabilized; but the enrollment rate of women students aged 18-24 is still increasing. The women's rights movement, the rising consciousness of the elderly, and the general trend toward lifelong education and retraining have dramatically increased the number of part-time students in postsecondary education. Figure II indicates the formidable share of the higher education market already made up of part-time students, the vast majority of whom are adults. At community and junior colleges, where the overall average age is 30, and 35 for women students, part-time students comprise over 61 percent of the total enrollments in the fall of 1978. Full-time enrollments have declined slightly over the past two years, and part-time enrollments have increased steadily for all sectors.

Figure I

FAMILY MEMBERS ENROLLED IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION BY KIND – SPRING 1976

TOTAL ENROLLMENT 9,809,000
SEPARATE FAMILIES 8,032,000



SOURCE: Bureau of the Census
Special Run for Sen. Moynihan, 1978

Figure II

FALL 1978 ENROLLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION BY STUDENT STATUS AND INSTITUTIONAL TYPE

(Includes Graduate Enrollment; Excludes Vocational and Proprietary Students)



TOTAL ENROLLMENT

ALL INSTITUTIONS	11,354,756
FULL TIME	6,694,705; 59%
PART TIME	4,660,051; 41%

SOURCE: National Center for Education Statistics, Preliminary Data, January 1979.

TAILORING EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS TO ADULT AND PART-TIME STUDENTS BECOMES A *NEW CHALLENGE TO UNIVERSITIES*

Mr. Hawkins highlights a senior management program at Harvard University that emphasizes general ideas and problem solving. He likes the idea that the educational process in that program was especially designed to meet the ego needs of adult students and to use their experiences as examples in these discussions. While special programs of this sort are advisable, older students often face serious problems in going back to college.

The hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education in August, 1979, in Vermont outlined some of the problems. Dr. Miller stated that the adult students attending the community colleges of Vermont (97 percent of the total enrollment) made up two distinct bimodal distributions.[8] One of the groups was similar to the adult students depicted by Hawkins — not necessarily oriented toward a degree, but interested in "education for its own sake rather than as a means to an end." Dr. Miller indicated that this group tended already to have a credential and they had lived less than four years, on the average, in the local community. They were also wealthier than the second large group which was comprised of locally born, first generation college-goers who worked full-time and were very serious and credential oriented. The second group was largely denied the benefits of employee education programs because their ranks were below mid-management, and they were completely ineligible for state and federal student assistance programs which discriminate against independent (adult) and part-time students. (Many of these inequities against adult part-time students should be corrected by the Education Amendments of 1980 currently under consideration by the Congress.)

As enrollments of adult students continue to increase in the future, four-year colleges and universities may want to cater more to the needs of part-time graduate students and other students who already have credentials and who

desire the liberal arts and knowledge for its own sake. The two-year colleges will probably continue to have their share of lifelong learners due to their geographical spread, but they may want to focus energies on the group of undereducated adults, a group still experiencing a problem with access to higher education, as depicted by Dr. Miller.

SPONSORING FORUMS FOR THE STUDY AND DISCUSSION OF VALUES

In addition to suggesting that the state university should bring career education and the liberal arts more closely together and should promote adult education in the liberal arts, A. G. Hawkins also suggests the public university should sponsor forums for the study and discussion of values. This is the most tenuous of Mr. Hawkins' suggestions. It is tenuous because there is a distinction between ethics and the morality or religious values to which Mr. Hawkins alludes. One of the reasons the public supports public colleges and universities is to insure an alternative form of higher education from that offered by sectarian groups. Indeed, major social movements (e.g., the women's movement) have clashed head-on with the "values" of religious sectors. If, as Mr. Hawkins alleges, some people have found the values and convictions of public schools so offensive to them that they have in turn set up their own schools, others support the public schools for those same values and convictions.

One of the most outrageous and unfortunate semantic exercises often practiced by private college interests in Washington is calling public colleges and universities "government schools." The connotation is to suggest that the state government controls, rather than merely funds the state institutions. Yet, these same private college interests who call public colleges government schools insist that their colleges are "independent." The vast majority of these independent colleges are church-related, and many are church-controlled. They are hardly independent in the same sense that most people use the word.

If private, sectarian colleges and universities have a

responsibility to teach their students religiously derived values and ethics, then public institutions have the responsibility to teach students to think for themselves, to evaluate various value-related philosophies for themselves, and to expose the students without coercion to the major beliefs of prominent cultures. Teaching of morality and ethics is a responsibility of one's family and religious order; and *only those aspects of morality and ethics enforced by government need be discussed by public entities, e.g., colleges.* In the latter case, those aspects of morality and ethics enforced by government permeate most cultures and religious orders and are thus more neutral and appropriate topics for public universities.

Public colleges have a responsibility to provide local citizens with community forums on topics of interest, not to preach to them the particular religiously derived ethical views of a well-meaning professor. For instance, in March, 1980, some 1200 colleges will be participating in a program funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities to help local citizens examine the "impact of the national energy problem on the future quality of their lives."[9] This is a fine example of the integration of aspects of a liberal education with an immediate, real, socioeconomic and environmental problem. There should be more work toward this end of involving colleges with their communities by working on public problems. Such work would indeed be beneficial to the colleges by making their continued fiscal strength and viability a social necessity.

The future will no doubt require higher education to redirect some of its curricula in the manner suggested by Mr. Hawkins. The growing adult student population will give impetus to this movement as older students voice concerns for relevancy as part of theoretical learning. Not every college will change, however, and of those that change, not every college will change in the same ways.

If enrollment shifts cause institutions of higher education to conduct self-studies and to reassess their master plans, some schools will choose to close. Others will attempt

to become more collegiate, hoping for a larger share of the traditional market. Others will actively recruit and accommodate adults. Mr. Hawkins suggests that integrating the liberal arts and career oriented programs and promoting adult education as a major part of the university's purpose would be positive developments in their own right — apart from their practical function in stabilizing enrollments and attracting greater political support from the public. However, without the environmental certainty that the markets of traditional college students will dry up for some colleges and universities over the next decade, there would be little discussion today about how universities can adapt for older students or how such institutions can better serve their public. Social change does not occur for institutions as conservative and as distinct as colleges and universities unless the consequences of not responding to their environmental crises are more threatening than making the needed changes themselves.

NOTES

1Alfred G. Hawkins, "Higher Education and the Good Society," in *Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Views and Reviews*, ed. John Y. Reid (Toledo, Ohio: John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education, The University of Toledo, 1980).

2Verbal statement of Dr. John Eurich, Dean, Goddard College, and of Myrna R. Miller, Dean, Community College of Vermont, August 10, 1979.

3W. Frank Abbott, assistant vice president training and education, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, "The Corporate University: Training and Education in the Bell System," testimony prepared for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Human Resources in its hearing on "The Workplace and Higher Education: Perspectives for the Coming Decade." June 6 and 7, 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

4*Ibid.*, p. 4.

5Testimony before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, June 7, 1979, Washington, D.C. by Jerome M. Ziegler, Dean, New York State College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, p. 1.

6*Ibid.*, p. 2

7Robert D. Behn, "The End of the Growth Era in Higher Education," Institute of Policy Science and Public Affairs, Duke University, June, 1979, p. 1.

8Miller, *op. cit.*

9"Energy and the Way We Live." A National Issues Forum,

conducted by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, Diane Eisenberg, Director, with funds from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Department of Energy (project brochure).

HIGHER EDUCATION'S CULTURAL OBLIGATIONS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF MAN'S RELIGIOUS HERITAGE

Donald E. Heintschel*

I stand before you today in the tradition of Paris and Thomas Aquinas, in the tradition of Oxford and John Duns Scotus and Roger Bacon, in the tradition of Salamanca and Bologna. One of the great achievements in the history of Christendom, even from a purely secular viewpoint, was the origin and development of the university. No other religious tradition — Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism — took the mind of man and his world so seriously.

Bernard of Chartres wrote in the twelfth century: ". . . We are like dwarfs seated on the shoulders of giants; we see more things than the ancients and things more distant, but this is due neither to the sharpness of our own sight, nor the greatness of our stature, but because we are borne aloft on that giant mass."[1] And so the "giant mass" of Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Maimonides, and Jesus and Justinian shaped the schoolmen and was the foundation of the universities as places where the intellect of man could safely range, sure to find its refuge and its judge in the tribunal of truth. The beliefs and values debated in the universities shaped the institutions, sacred and secular, as well as the destiny of man for many centuries.

It was some of the same spirit that shaped the American college. As Bernard Murchland has pointed out, liberal education ". . . was from the beginning a perfective process, a shaping of human sensibility toward desirable and rationally justified patterns of action. It was quite frankly an ethical enterprise, involving nothing less than the transformation of the individual. . . . "[2]

Do we have a current reading on American higher edu-

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cation? Dr. Steven Muller, president of Johns Hopkins, writing in the *New York Times* in January said this:

> . . . the problem is that the knowledge explosion of our times has brought with it such a high degree of fragmentation and specialization. Teaching at the collegiate level — most particularly in the collegiate component of major universities — is performed by specialists whose focus is much more narrow and refined than was that of their predecessors of years ago.
>
> Inevitably the college curriculum reflects the competence of the faculty. Thus faculties of specialists have created curriculums that aggregate, but fail to integrate, highly specialized knowledge. Their students learn a great deal, but in fragments. In too many places and too often, the liberal-arts curriculum has become a mosaic that is ever more diverse and ever more lacking in form and design. When that happens, the graduate is no longer a generalist with a sound foundation; instead, he or she is a specialist without vocation.[3]

This telling assessment should make us stop to ask some questions regarding the future of American higher education and the way in which we educate and train people for our world. Dr. Muller is concerned about the future of the humanities and the liberal arts in the face of the strong pressures toward professionalism. Implicit in this is a worry about the formation of personal values in students, as well as a vague feeling that something fundamental may be wrong with America's moral life and a strong sense that there may be a serious vacuum in our concern for ethical and value problems.

While different people will evaluate the relative weight of the different causes in different ways, a consensus seems to be emerging. American higher education must, once again, find a central and fundamental role for ethical and value issues in the curriculum. American higher education must

17

not forget its roots. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was taken for granted that higher education required that students be given a full exposure to the values of western culture and a rigorous training in moral philosophy. Of course, it was considerably easier at that time, when, despite religious pluralism, there still remained a core of values considered fundamental to the American tradition. There were many causes for the rooting out of that heritage. The rise of science, for some at least, signalled the end of a religious basis for value systems. At the same time the increasing professionalism of academics tended to push to one side a more fundamental questioning of basic human premises.

It is all too easy to think that the present and growing concern with values in education simply represents an attempt to regain something that was lost, or that the problem is one of our growing awareness of the moral corruption in our society. That is too facile a reading. The increasing complexity of contemporary life has caused the emergence of a whole list of new ethical dilemmas. Who would have conceived of the science of bio-ethics a generation ago? Contemporary life and science have brought to the fore a whole new range of questions that simply did not confront earlier generations. Even if an education in ethics and values had remained at the heart of American higher education, the new issues and problems would in themselves have been reason enough to reconsider the basic premises in the educational process.

It is often alleged that ethical and human values are antithetical to the objectives of higher education; yet as we look at our world, we are immediately aware of the necessity of developing a critical capacity to make value judgments. Pope John Paul II, in the first encyclical since his election, gives us his reading:

> ...e man of today seems ever to be under t... ...om what he produces, that is to say, from ...ult of the work of his intellect and the ten...cies of his will. All too soon, and often in an

unforseeable way, what this manifold activity of man yields is not only subjected to "alienation" in the sense that it is simply taken away from the person who produces it, but rather it turns against man himself, at least in part, through the indirect consequences of its effects returning on himself. It is or can be directed against him. This seems to make up the main chapter of the drama of present day human existence in its broadest and universal dimension. Man therefore lives increasingly in fear.

He is afraid that what he produces can radically turn against himself. He is afraid that it can become the means and instrument for unimaginable self-destruction, compared with which all the cataclysms and catastrophes of history known to us seem to fade away. This gives rise to the question: Why is it that the power given to man from the beginning by which he was to subdue earth turns against himself, producing an understandable state of anxiety?[4]

This is a disquieting reading of the signs of the times. Pope John Paul II concludes his assessment with these telling words: "The development of technology and the development of contemporary civilization, which is marked by the ascendancy of technology, demand a proportional development of morals and ethics. For the present this last development seems unfortunately to be always left behind."[5] Pope John Paul II is asking the question: are we willing to let our technical elite be the shapers of our future? If higher education does not include this or a similar reading of the signs of the times as a part of its definition of truth, it is being untrue to itself. The time is ripe for a revival of our search for values in education, for critical thinking, and for a clarification of our commitments.

The university is not a church, nor a business enterprise, nor a little kingdom unto itself. The university must be a learning community, a discovering community. It must be a community that is willing to expose its members to the

many conflicting expressions of reality that are a part of today's world. It must confront these assumptions to enable the student to resolve them. The university must strive to create an environment that will stimulate students' intellectual, moral, and emotional growth, so that they may ground their skills in a more mature human framework of values. It cannot be an isolated thinktank, however, when it undertakes these processes; rather, as a community, the university, its faculty and students alike, must situate itself in the real world. It should become a center for responsible and careful criticism of all aspects of society. Graduates, if they have experienced a fully human education, should be change agents within society for a more just and humane world. I firmly believe that we need to develop a moral education that touches upon and instills a real sense of social responsibility.

Isn't it interesting that we live in a nation where the language of morality comes so easily to our lips? This amuses many of my European colleagues who see this as a national character flaw. Because of this, one would think that we would be forerunners in the teaching of ethics and values. Yet, the opposite is true.

A great deal of skepticism and apathy about the need for education in human values is current. It is difficult to work up any enthusiasm about social criticism and social and moral education as a function of higher education. Professionally, this is considered too subjective and unscientific, too loaded with the passions of the past or the errors of the present; nevertheless, values are what shape, move, or destroy a society.

Ironically, there is a value system at the heart and center of higher education. It is truth, sought not only as an end in itself, but also as a means to discover other truths that can serve as a basis for making choices. Might not the university itself be the place where the search for values begins? In this light, I find the suggestion in a recent commentary of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to be on target:

All of the major controversies on American college

> campuses are centered on moral issues. Charges of the abridgment of personal freedom, of physical abuse of persons, of the misuse of resources or authority, of prejudice or discrimination in student admissions or faculty appointments and advancement, of cheating, or of misappropriating work and credit that belong to others are some of the many campus issues that are morally based. Some of them are uniquely relevant to the college itself, but many involve standards that are appropriate both to a college and to any democratic pluralistic society.[6]

For the schoolmen of the first universities, these issues would have served as an essential ingredient in the dialectic of the development of a science of ethics. The debates would have been heated and the arguments diverse, but the resolution of these questions would have served as criteria and a basis for the definition of universal moral principles that could be applied to arenas other than academia. One wonders at times what has happened to that spirit of intellectual searching for truth and honesty. Is the goal of education today so narrowly defined that the possibility for serious reflection on the value content of truth is denied as an essential ingredient?

Last December, I spent an evening with a group of medical students here in Toledo, young men and women, seriously searching for the human dimensions and value systems of the profession they have chosen. At this juncture they had experienced their training as the development of skills necessary to evaluate clinical data about persons. They found this essentially dehumanizing for patients as well as themselves. I am sure that there are medical educators who would deny the validity and relevance of the questions these young people were asking me; yet I could not help feeling they were searching for values that would make their professional and personal lives as physicians more meaningful. All of them had denied their religious heritage in adolescence. They had become free and agnostic. There remained, however, a gnawing urgency to explore with someone a system of values that

might give another orientation to their professional development.

My experience with these medical students is but one example of an increasing concern in our society about human value questions. It is no accident that many current issues, such as poverty, pollution, racism, and urban blight were first discovered on the campus or that students were the first to agitate about them.

All this would indicate to me the pressing need to again explore alternatives whereby higher education might recognize its role in shaping the curriculum so that values become an integral part of the academic enterprise. It was heartening to discover that the 1976 Carnegie Council Surveys indicated that 62 percent of undergraduates noted the formation of values and goals as essential outcomes of their education, and for an additional 31 percent (for a total of 93 percent) that outcome was very important.[7] Since values are not the monopoly of any one segment of our society, it seems we are obliged to find common values, values to which all members of the community might in good conscience pay allegiance irrespective of race, color, or creed. What would a twentieth century schoolman have to say about our search? Jacques Maritain has written that in the modern world the only solution is pluralistic:

> Men belonging to most different philosophical or religious creeds and families could and should cooperate in the common task and for the common welfare of the earthly community, provided they similarly assent to the basic tenets of a society of free men. . . .
>
> Thus it is that men possessing quite different, even opposite, metaphysical or religious outlooks — materialists, idealists, agnostics, Christians and Jews, Moslems and Buddhists — can converge, not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, toward the same practical conclusions, and can share in the

same practical democratic philosophy, provided that they similarly revere, perhaps for quite diverse reasons, truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good.[8]

The fact that we have gathered at this conference to reflect upon the cultural obligations of higher education is in itself an enterprise in searching for values. I commend The University of Toledo for sponsoring our coming together. I do hope that it is a herald for future conversations, since it could have a telling effect upon our community and our world.

In the mediaeval tradition of the *universitas*, higher education must again become faithful to its fullness and to the power of tradition to affirm the goodness of human culture, while redeeming it from its human limitations. The university must never be parochial, timid, or afraid to face the difficult questions of our world. It must be intellectually honest and academically responsible, searching for truth in all areas of human experience, confronting moral issues and reflecting upon all in the light of ethical insights and values. In short, higher education must be open to all who want to be part of it and are concerned with everything human. This should be done not in a spirit of mere intellectual curiosity, but out of a true love for man, his works, and his struggles, as well as for each person in his or her longing for justice, true freedom, and understanding of the full dignity and destiny of each and all.

NOTES

1*Summa Aurea*, as cited in Henri Daniel-Rops, *L'Eglise de la Cathedrale et de la Croisade* (Paris: Libraire Artheme Fayard), 1953, p. 313.

2Bernard Murchland, "The Eclispe of the Liberal Arts," *Change* 8, no. 10 (1976): 22.

3Steven Muller, "On the Liberal Arts and the Job Market," *Education Supplement* in the *New York Times*, 7 January 1979, p. 19.

4Pope John Paul II, "Redeemer of the World" (10 March 1979), printed in *Origins* 8, no. 40 (22 March 1979), p. 8.

5*Ibid.*

6Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, *Missions of the College Curriculum* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977), p. 241.

7Carnegie Foundation, pp. 240-241.

8Jacques Maritain, "The Foundations of Democracy," *The Nation* 160 (21 April 1945): 440-441.

A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW OF VALUES AND ETHICS

Susan W. Cameron and John Y. Reid*

While the spirit of inquiry has in many ways shaped the American college, the discovery of new knowledge was not a major goal of American higher education until the latter part of the nineteenth century. The fact that the recitation method of teaching was predominant until about one hundred years ago is evidence of this truth. The chief aims of that method were mental discipline and the inculcation of piety. Of course, one cannot forget who many of the early American college educators were; they were clergymen, heirs to a long and lofty tradition the American college had served, a tradition of providing practical training for ministers, as well as for civic leaders. The prescribed classical curriculum was directly relevant to the needs of training for the ministry, and the recitation method was an appropriate pedagogical technique.

Over the last century, vast changes have occurred in both the curriculum and the methods of instruction in higher education. Society also has undergone changes so vast as to make it difficult to compare institutional structures of early American colonial life with those of today. One way of looking at the changes that occur in society and in higher education is to adopt a structural-developmental framework. Roy T. Tamashiro uses Piaget's treatment of the psychological development of the child to make the following assumptions about developmental stages:

> 1. As individuals progress through life, there are distinct, qualitative changes in their thought processes. These qualitative differences are called stages. A person's assumptions, concerns and way of reasoning vary from one stage to another.

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2. All individuals pass through the stages in an invariant sequence. One individual may progress through the stages faster or slower than another individual, but the sequence remains constant.

3. Each stage is a coherent thought-organization pattern or a "structural whole." At each stage there is an inner logic that structures the individual's thoughts and concerns.

4. The stages are hierarchical integrations. Each new stage builds on, transmutes and integrates the prior stage. The new stage, in turn, prepares the way for the following stage.

5. The stages are relatively stable. Stage advancement or change occurs very slowly. The thought-structure at each stage tends to maintain itself by filtering out data it cannot accommodate.

6. Stage sequence is not synonymous with chronological age. An individual's progress through the stages may stop at any stage or at any age.[1]

While this description refers to the individual, it is not difficult to view a society and its institutions as developing in similar stages. Robert Heilbroner documents shifts in the definition of human nature and in the evaluation of the matters people attend to and consider important. For example, he describes the shift to the market-economy man from the definition of man that sustained, and was sustained by, the feudal culture of the middle ages.[2] This shift required enormous changes in values and organizational styles. Similarly, one could use a developmental concept like that which gave rise to Blake's vision of a social order which moved from innocence to experience to a higher innocence to better understand general changes in world view and values which have taken place in America since colonial times, changes which have direction.

This type of concept allows one to describe American

culture as moving from a religious basis for truth and value to a scientific base for truth and value. Within this general paradigm, also, higher education's purpose can be viewed specifically as reflecting the needs of a social order which has moved from an elite, to a meritocratic, to an egalitarian educational model. The elite model of education was adopted by the colonial colleges, which endorsed a core religious value set. The meritocratic model, rooted in competition and democratic progress, was widely adopted in the nineteenth century by colleges endorsing a scientific base for truth and value. The egalitarian model is relatively new, and it is not yet clear what the corresponding, complex base for truth and value really is.

In his analysis of what he sees as the current crisis in values, Father Donald Heintschel presents a subjective snapshot of cultural movement. However, a structural-developmental framework helps achieve a distance that engenders some objectivity; and it is possible to examine Father Heintschel's analysis using such a framework. If one does this, it is possible to look at our culture and see not a crisis in values but an evolutionary process in which values develop over time. As this process continues, higher education, as a social institution, responds to society's needs, which change as the culture evolves. It is useful to keep this in mind when elaborating on an important point made by Father Heintschel:

> During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, . . . higher education required that students be given a full exposure to the values of western culture and rigorous training in moral philosophy. Of course, it was considerably easier at the time, when, despite religious pluralism, there still remained a core of values considered fundamental to the American tradition. . . . The rise of science, for some at least, signalled the end of a religious basis for value systems.[3]

It is probably correct to view the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a time of relatively stable values, even though the seeds for change were certainly present.

Many men entering the colleges in America during that period continued the dominant seventeenth century practice of training for the ministry to serve the needs of an agrarian population. Largely because travel and communication between the colonies were limited, people could rely on transmitting to the next generation a value set that would serve them through adulthood. Class structures were relatively stable, and the division of labor by class, sex, and race was accepted by the majority. A religious basis for the dominant value system underlay the social order. Interpretations of reward and punishment, heaven and hell, as well as orthodoxy and heresy, provided definitions of deviant social behavior.

The values emanating from piety, a fear of God, work, production, and reproduction were both socially and religiously confirmed. Life was harsh in the new world, and values based on a religious concept of an afterlife were comforting. Also, the average life span was so short that many people did not have leisure time to detect changes in the culture. There were many deaths from childbirth, and most children did not live to age five because of childhood diseases like smallpox, diphtheria, and pneumonia. Clearly, conditions of life in the new world were compatible with a philosophy of rewards in a life beyond.

In the colonies, because life was harsh and short, people could likely see or feel only the smallest cultural changes. This is important in understanding the colonists' responses to knowledge and to values. Inventions infiltrated the society at a pace which was slow relative to the average life span. Thought processes in this period were basically linear, and events were viewed as sequential. For example, life development was viewed as including a brief childhood, followed by work in the field at age seven or eight. Boys were then apprenticed to men, and girls were apprenticed in homes as domestics. Marriage commonly occurred for girls in their early teens, and they usually gave birth shortly thereafter. They worked until death, which in the late nineteenth century was on the average, age forty. In a sequential world, according to theory, problems can be anticipated and con-

trolled, and it was this kind of world, with a slow rate of change and high mortality rates, in which people shared a core of values based on religious truth.

Father Heintschel maintains that this heritage was "rooted out." From a developmental standpoint, the shift in perspective to a scientific world view changed the categories used for measuring and arriving at truth. The shift also involved a movement from an intuitive mode to induction based on scientific methods. Although, as Father Heintschel notes, science and technology introduced increasing complexity into modern life, the religious heritage was not, in fact, "rooted out." Rather, with the adoption of a scientific world view, our religious heritage was mythologized and integrated into the culture in its new form. It was the religious basis for social control that was destroyed, not the religious heritage itself.

If a culture indeed goes through stages in development, the stages represent a continuum of increasing complexity. At the same time, individuals have an increasingly complex understanding of their world. For instance, economic man, a more complicated being than his predecessor, emerged largely as a result of the increase in scientific knowledge and the implementation of technology in everyday work. However, as suggested by the transformation of religion from a dominant social force to a source of individual belief, the concerns and themes of earlier stages do not entirely disappear as a culture progresses to later stages.

As changing societal needs reflected general cultural changes, a different kind of response was needed from an educational system which had generally been elitist until the middle of the nineteenth century. This was the meritocratic response, the chief result of which was the inclusion in the educational system of many students from previously excluded segments of society. In addition, both the industrial revolution and increasingly complex governmental-military needs had an impact on higher education in the nineteenth century. In the industrial age, machines were the tools that revolutionized society, and out of this age came the begin-

nings of institutional specialization in higher education. The land grant institutions, agriculture stations for research, and engineering and technical institutes were founded in the nineteenth century.

But even as such specific cultural changes indicate a new intellectual paradigm is functioning, a new paradigm does not replace the old without a struggle, as Kuhn has pointed out in relation to scientific revolutions.[4] The emergence of economic man, with science as his measure of truth, was opposed by orthodox educators for many years. Specifically, the response to science in the curriculum has been described by Lawrence Veysey as "intransigence, panic, or self-deceptive compromise in an effort to gain leverage."[5] Orthodox educators did not oppose science as an organized body of information about a particular subject. Rather, they resisted science to the extent that it claimed to be a philosophy which could explain the entire universe.

The gradual shift to science and technology as the frame for measuring truth was a complex development in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The emerging value system was compatible with economic-market man and a society engaged in transforming the frontier into an industrial state. Certain institutional values emerged which have been termed "frontier values": individualism, production, competition, efficiency, and specialism. These values were in turn based on the priorities of the industrial state, which included efficient production of goods, a steady expansion of their output and consumption, a preference for goods over leisure, commitment to technological change, autonomy of the technostructure, and an adequate supply of trained and educated manpower.[6]

As one of society's most important institutions, the emerging university was engaged in educating professionals with increasing degrees of specialism suited to a society in which consumption needs outdistanced production and service capacity. Education, therefore, accommodated its goals to frontier, expansion needs.

The frontier values listed above influenced the structure

of the curriculum and influenced pedagogy, as both came to reflect an orientation toward abstract, highly symbolic skills, whether technical or managerial. Intellectual growth and competition for grades were promoted, often at the expense of emotional development and personal, family, and community values. But the real danger to values, from a traditional religious perspective, was science's challenge to the certainty of religious truth. In place of certainty, science offered relativity, tenuousness, and hypothesis to be tested. This perceived danger has prevailed, especially since the development of the Theory of Relativity:

> "So we see," as Einstein put it, "that we cannot attach any *absolute* signification to the concept of simultaneity, but that two events which, viewed from a system of coordinates, are simultaneous, can no longer be looked upon as simultaneous events when envisaged from a system which is in motion relatively to that system."[7]

One of the responses to such a revolution in descriptions of the universe as relativity theory imposes is outright fear that society is no longer controlled by humans. Commenting on Jacques Ellul's perception, R. J. Forbes, the eminent Dutch historian of science and technology says, "Ellul seems to endow *La Technique* [the technological order] not only with anthropomorphic but with demonological attributes."[8] One of the reasons for panic is a qualitative and quantitative change brought about by the ever-increasing rate of cultural change; and it is this which differentiates our times from previous ones. C. P. Snow identified the transformation in his famous lecture *The Two Cultures*:

> During all human history until this century, the rate of social change has been very slow. So slow, that it could pass unnoticed in one person's lifetime. This is no longer so. The rate of change has increased so much that our imagination can't keep up.[9]

In our lifetime, as Russell Ackoff points out, there has been a greater increase in the speed of travel than there was in

all history up to now. The rate at which information can be communicated, energy generated, and products manufactured and made obsolete means that in your lifetime and mine society has had to face larger changes than civilization had to face from its inception up to our births. And the rate of change continues to accelerate.[10]

This bears on a question suggested by Pope John Paul II, and stated by Father Donald Heintschel thusly, "are we willing to let our technical elite be the shapers of our future?"[11] It is, however, a question which has to be rephrased since the technical elite have indeed shaped our present and from all accounts will continue to do so. What needs to be asked is what kind of society will develop, given the advanced technology symbolized by the electronic digital computer, and what kinds of values need nurturing in the emerging post-industrial revolution of automation? How can we shape our future to insure a world in which we reach Blake's "higher innocence," a world which integrates the earlier stages represented by religious man and economic-market man?

Higher education, according to many, recently has accepted an egalitarian model of education in which public policy stimulates legislation which provides higher education subsidies for the disadvantaged in our society and for the non-traditional student. Further, a strong commitment to challenging structures of racism and sexism has developed. These actions may be evidence of a positive direction in which society is moving.

Different critics have posed different descriptions of the new stage of development on the horizon. Robert Heilbroner, for one, believes there will be an integration of our past with our present:

> It is therefore possible that a post-industrial society would also turn in the direction of many pre-industrial societies—toward the exploration of inner states of experience rather than the outer world of fact and material accomplishment. Tradition and

> ritual, the pillars of life in virtually all societies other than those of an industrial character, would probably once again assert their ancient claim as a guide to and solace for life. The struggle for individual achievement, especially for material ends, is likely to give way to the acceptance of communally organized and ordered roles.[12]

It may be that the industrial state is "tarnished" by failing to promote values such as community, conservation, cooperation, and empathy. Because of the problematic situation concerning energy, these global village values may be desirable because they may be necessary. From the older educational goal of turning out a finished product with intellectual and managerial skills, the charge of the educator has expanded to include developing people who serve the community, rather than individual, needs and interests. This goal of education corresponds to an egalitarian model of higher education.

Another description of the integration of the religious world view and the scientific world view is the "Integrated System" of Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener. This system involves elements of both world views and includes major characteristics such as supernatural, moral, emotional, mythic, and intuitive values, as well as empirical, practical, scientific, tentative, and sensory values.[13] Many twentieth century philosophers of history seem to believe it likely that some new kind of religious stage will follow a termination of scientific, pragmatic culture.

While we do not know the content of the third stage, nor can we delineate the process of cultural evolution with accuracy, we can say each stage is concerned with a value set of its own. As it builds on, transmutes, and integrates the prior stage, the value questions of the new stage begin to appear. When one uses a structural-developmental framework, it becomes clear that the cultural values in each stage are central to individual societies. As our society has moved through different stages, the rate of acceleration of change has unnerved those of us who have lived long enough to be

inundated by change. At the same time, each stage poses pressing value questions which are an inherent part of the social order. For our society to thrive, we must vigorously address these questions.

NOTES

1Roy T. Tamashiro, "Developmental Stages in the Conceptualization of Marriage," *Family Coordinator* (July 1973), p. 237.

2Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Making of Economic Society* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 223-224 *et passim.*

3Donald E. Heintschel, "Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: The Perspective of Man's Religious Heritage," in *Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Views and Reviews*, ed. John Y. Reid (Toledo, Ohio: John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education, The University of Toledo, 1980), p. 42.

4Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 148-149 *et passim.*

5Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 44.

6John K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 343 *et passim.*

7Ronald W. Clark, *Einstein: The Life and Times* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1971), p. 88.

8R. J. Forbes, *The Conquest of Nature* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 73.

9C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures: and A Second Look* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 42-43.

10Russell L. Ackoff, *Redesigning the Future* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 5.

11Heintschel, p. 43.

12Robert L. Heilbroner, *An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 140.

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THE FINE ARTS AND HUMAN VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Roger Mandle*

Those of us associated with the arts like to reassure ourselves that the visual arts play an important, civilizing role in higher education. Gratifying are our thoughts of graduates, whatever their major or their intended career, who are educated to be inspired by a great symphony or painting, to be avocational artists, or to be patrons of our museums. More and more young adults are participating in the arts, finding them satisfying, relevant, and enriching. We are glad, but worried, about the appeal of university arts curricula. The job market in all fields of the professional arts is highly competitive, but I think we all feel that those who don't "make it" as artists will be better appreciators of the arts for having made the struggle. We are satisfied that the humanizing aspects of the arts, as we like to describe them, are being incorporated into society by our efforts.

Does this larger audience, this wider understanding, this greater participation indicate an incorporation of the human value of the arts into the fabric of our society? One would have to examine two aspects of the question — What are the so-called human values of the arts and how can one tell whether they were being used? — to find an appropriate answer.

I propose to list and describe some values of the arts to society in a hierarchical arrangement which I have devised to indicate the considerations which might be used to systematize some of art's meanings. I then hope to describe some aspects of the society into which we are releasing our students, in an effort to relate their use of art to this context. Some of the meanings of art I have found are quite literal, while others are based on philosophical theories.

My distinguished colleague Dr. Earl McGrath once

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65

quoted a thought from Abraham Kaplan's *The Travesty of the Philosophers* which suggests a comparison to the contemporary role of the arts:

> The gap is widening in our time between professional philosophers and the philosophies men live by. If what is important in life does not appear in professional work, or is brought in only to be negated, the work cannot have any place in the important contexts of life.

In the arts, or at least for the arts, the realms of philosophers seem to stay vibrant. From absolute questions of beauty to relativistic areas of inquiry such as the nature of perception and beauty, the arts have served as banners for new thinking. The arts give physical manifestation to these philosophical ideas and become models of the very relevancy which McGrath and Kaplan seek. But here I give clues to my conclusions yet to come.

The first level of my hierarchy in the meaning of value pertaining to the arts is the *relative value* of art in the commercial world. As we all know from the vast amount of recent publicity about the art market, for example, paintings, furniture, prints, drawings, or anything else which is unique and original (and has been judged to have some quality) has some commercial worth. This base value accrues to art due to rarity, as well as to social, historical, and aesthetic factors which suggest other levels of relative values.

On a superficial level, the *social value* of art is an immediate result of the attraction and fashion for the object, or of the reflected stature that the ownership of the art will supposedly bring. But the social value also reflects, as Dewitt Parker has written in his essay "The Nature of Art," "part of the history and culture of a people." As such, art serves as an "aesthetic instrument," functioning "as stimuli of the aesthetic experience for many minds for its transmission to future generations." This instrument is also a vehicle for the imagination, which relies on the concrete form the artist has given it. The artist has created a harmonious form to

communicate to others "in patterns of sensations and meanings which may become parts of the experience of many minds."

The *historical value* of art is found in concrete examples of the creative ideas and techniques of expression that help us define civilizations. In some instances, the artifacts of a people may be the only means by which we can learn anything concrete about their patterns of life. The value of art is, therefore, directed by the history of human experience. Our literal abstractions of history are taken from art as one aspect of its meaning related to its social context.

While the historical value of a work of art can be the context it provides for understanding a culture, conversely the study of the work itself requires understanding of "the general social and intellectual conditions of the times to which it belongs" (Taine, *Philosophy of Art*, 1864). Such study incorporates what Erwin Panofsky called the process of "intuitive aesthetic re-creation" by which students not only appreciate the aesthetic value of the object, but familiarize themselves with the historical locus for the creative act. By this procedure, the students of art history can "correct their subjective feeling for content" based on their own contemporary perspectives, in a relatively scientific manner (Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline").

This method of study can reveal a shift in focus for today's students of art, such that the aesthetic meaning of the work of art becomes more important as an experience than the original meaning intended for the work at the time of its creation. For example, at the time an altarpiece was made for a church, it was created to convey a religious message. Today, however, this religious meaning may be obscured by students' distance from the work's context. Thus, although the cognitive meaning of the work of art may still be relevant and decipherable, the students may find the visual symbolic language and technique of delivering the work's message more meaningful than the message itself.

The next level involves *aesthetic value*, in which the

qualities of artistic imagination and expression are prime determinants. As Dewitt Parker has said, "the aesthetic value is a transfer of practical value to the plane of the imagination." The study of pure aesthetics is the wrestling ground of philosophers; it is a realm of thought elevated beyond language and form. Yet aesthetic value is borne of the subjective interpretation of the concrete, the experienced. Roger Fry ("Essay on Aesthetics" in *Form and Design*) wrote that art "is the chief organ of the imaginative life; it is by art that it is stimulated and controlled within us." Yet this unclear, imprecise relationship of one person's imagination, his or her creative act, and the perception and re-imagination by the beholder, has been one of the most fascinating philosophical problems. It would take volumes to review the theories developed about this connection, for they relate to the most basic aspects of art and being — from the nature of the perceived to the nature of the perceiver, and to the nature of perception itself.

The last and highest level is that of the *absolute value* of art. In this realm, art is a virtue in and of itself, although determinations of quality and beauty are possible, whether they are really absolute or are, in fact, relative to the perceiver. The arts provide opportunities to solve complex problems in language systems which are as abstract from life as mathematics, yet unlike other modes used in problem solving, the arts retain expressive power to render emotion to beholders. How well the visual, musical, or verbal problem has been solved by the artist can be judged in intuitive ways depending on the perceiver's knowledge of its cultural contexts and of its abstract harmonies of form. There are critics whose knowledge of their field is combined with great eyes or ears. Like a basketball player with a great pair of hands, a critic has talents similar to those of the artist, talents which cannot be taught but can be developed.

The students we turn out must be taught to perceive the qualities of the world they have inherited and to understand systems by which they can improve it. Much has been written about the compartmentalized existence we lead, in which "only that which relates to us is real," as Harvey Cox has

written in *The Secular City*. Cox says we live in a secular world in which everything is seen only as a series of problems and projects. There is no longer any unfathomable mystery to life, just a set of provisional solutions to unsolvable problems. It is in such a society, for example, that Herman Goering could plan the destruction of his enemies while hungering for the beauty of paintings from the Kaiser Friedrich and Louvre Museums. It is also in such a society that business people responsible for important decisions about the appearance of our cities can recognize the importance of the arts, support its institutions, and yet can authorize the design of commercial buildings that add up to the strips of fast food restaurants, gas stations, and shopping centers which are destroying the visual quality of our environment.

In describing the lifestyle of modern *technopolitan* society which fosters these commercial bureaucrats, Harvey Cox says that it is profane and supramundane: "Things do not exist in themselves; they are no longer substances, but exist in and for the sake of what they do with us and what we do with them." In such a world, morality is a relative matter, and pragmatic solutions only involve factors immediate to decisions. In such a world values are determinations of *relative worth* rather than the determinations of *absolute quality*.

Interest in the quality of life must be taught students by example and by application in such a way that they can make connections between the knowledge of ideas and the knowledge of things. Works of art can be the touchstones of this kind of learning because they are concrete examples of the history and systems of thought. The arts can be the focus of a university curriculum, binding disciplines together and creating the ambiance for learning how to make value judgments in a wide historical and intellectual context. The arts can also serve to give credibility to the role of emotions in life.

The modern urban university has an obligation to develop opportunities for its students to learn value systems which they can use as they make their way in our post-

industrial society. The value systems of the arts I described earlier are good teaching devices which imply ethical modes of thought in broad contexts. The *relative value* of the arts shows historical patterns of the commercial value of the arts. In this regard, curricula could involve the study of trends in the art market as they relate to the historic patterns of taste and fashion, economic forces of the times, or the practices of patrons.

Around *social value* systems could develop curricula which incorporate various modes of expression in different cultures, and the political and social forces affecting these modes of thought. The psychological and metaphysical aspects of images of primitive societies might also be topics for inquiry.

The *historical value* of art could be explored by emphasizing factual data related to particular forms of art. For example, what might the archaeological remains of an ancient city tell us, in the sequence of their discovery, about the development of a particular culture?

The *aesthetic value* of art could be used in the study of the nature of imagination and of perception. Scientific data could be weighed and combined with philosophical arguments to draw conclusions or form opinions regarding the individual's perception of aesthetic value.

The *absolute value* of art could be used to teach about the qualitative aspects of creativity and to develop a heightened respect for the role of the individual in society. Connoisseurship in the arts could be related to students' current and future roles in contemporary life in such a way that they could begin to draw conclusions about the quality of their lives in a variety of contexts.

Whether we think we are training our students to make a living or to be good citizens, we must prepare them to recognize ethical values related to society and to organize themselves to act on behalf of their judgments about quality. They are best prepared to do this if they have been shown

how to make linkages between isolated issues, to react with genuine emotion, and to appreciate the broad questions facing their lives.

Students should expect universities to establish curricula which will bring together the elements needed to create the ambiance for this learning. Universities should be collegiate institutions in which departments work together to foster mutually beneficial programs. Given the shrinking financial resources available to universities, they should strive to maximize the connections between faculty members, departments, and resources available to them in the community.

Urban universities should particularly seek the help of local cultural institutions which can provide resources for the development of arts-related curricula. The University of Toledo has developed a unique relationship with The Toledo Museum of Art over the years, in which the Museum staff and collections have added to the University an art department of a caliber impossible for the University to develop itself. Recently, our staff and the University faculty have been planning ways in which the Museum can offer wider service to interdisciplinary approaches to the humanities.

Because the University and the Museum are both broad-based urban institutions of higher learning, they have the flexibility to develop new programs together to fit the continuing interest of adults in the humanities. We have both found that students and the adult general public are hungry for programs in the arts. With the help of the University, and with funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities, we inaugurated a program called *Timeframes*, in which broad topics are related to issues of the quality of life. For the first series, entitled *The New American Scene*, nearly 800 registered. The future of such programs seems bright.

The eminent art historian George Heard Hamilton has written that he ascribes to art "not only its end products of pleasure, but also its function as the primary humanizing element in the development of the human consciousness." For art to have this authority over the direction of our

consciousness, to humanize our increasingly dehumanized urban world, we must assure its presence in all aspects of our higher education system. I have often thought, rather simplistically perhaps, that the sciences give us the means to exist, but that the arts give us a reason to exist. The university's obligation to its students is to offer the opportunity to study the connections between the means and reasons for our existence. In this study lie some of the answers to the practical and ethical questions that we all face.

THE ARTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: AN APPROACH FOR THE EIGHTIES

Elizabeth C. French*

> The kind of art that can control the way we project ourselves in the world will perhaps be most like the art of a happening, in which an event and an environment mutually inform each other, in which each individual is a creative participant within a surrounding form.
>
> Jon Roush

Higher education is embarking on a particularly difficult journey as it approaches the 1980's. Its role as a vital force in society is being challenged, and the arts, as well as all other academic areas and services provided by the postsecondary community, will be subject to the examination. While the process of reevaluation may at times be painful, usually it becomes an enriching, illuminating, and strengthening experience. The opportunities for those in the community of education to advance and encourage creativity in the curriculum may be greater in the coming decade than in any previous era. It becomes crucial, therefore, to probe critically into the values and qualities associated with the fine arts in order to reassess how they may contribute more abundantly to the forthcoming new directions in our higher education system.

Observers of American life might assume that the large numbers of state and local art councils, municipal symphonies and museums, community theaters, and other performing companies are testimony to a rich and well established tradition of the arts in our institutions of higher learning. Such is not the case, however. The fine arts have been relative newcomers to higher education, and the assimilation of the arts as an established part of curriculum offerings of American postsecondary institutions did not occur until after World

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73

War I. Although dramatic arts existed at Harvard at the end of the 17th Century, dance did not appear until 1926, and the first film major was not found until 1930.

Following World War II there was an escalation in the growth and involvement of the arts on American campuses. This growth was not only a natural by-product of the overall expansion and interest in higher education during the late fifties and throughout the sixties, but could often be traced to the leadership, drive, and concern of top institutional administrators, usually the president of the university. Using National Center for Educational Statistics data, Jack Morrison showed that enrollments in schools of art, drama, and music increased nearly 40 percent from 1960-1965.[1] While few would debate that the arts have had something to contribute and that even a minimum amount of exposure to the products of the creative spirit have been of some value, the arts have continued to be assigned until now only a peripheral role in the higher education system.

This perimetric role may be attributed in part to a general lack of understanding and a failure of educators to perceive that the significant contribution the arts have made to society warrants an emphasis in postsecondary offerings. The community of higher education, in spite of its reputation for being on the cutting edge of creative and intellectual pursuits, has been somewhat slow to recognize those values in the arts which leaders of business, industry, and government have long since understood to be vital to the enrichment of the individual and the nation. Lewis Mayhew uses information from the Rockefeller Brothers Panel Report *The Performing Arts: Problems and Prospects* to suggest that the arts were not for the privileged few but for the many; that their place was not on the periphery of society but at its center; that they were not just forms of recreation but were central to our well being and happiness.[2] Roberta Graham points out that Goldwin A. McLellan, president of the Business Committee for the Arts, Inc., considers the contribution the arts make to business "is as valuable as a bank loan, as law and order, good roads, and adequate housing . . . 'as well as' a prudent investment in survival and growth."[3]

The peripheral role delegated to the arts may also be attributed to the general climate which has surrounded postsecondary education during the past two decades. Since the advent of Sputnik, the educational system has become preoccupied with producing skilled and well-informed specialists, primarily in the fields of science and technology. Unfortunately, and to the anathema of many educated members of the academy, this process has now too often become synonymous with the acquisition of facts, skills, certificates, and degrees. Many influential leaders of federal and state government, our students, and some members of the academic community consider higher education little more than an avenue for career preparation. While some of these individuals support the arts in the curriculum as a necessary adjunct to an expansion of the comprehensive educational enterprise, they frankly reject the arts as being worthy subjects for serious pursuit.

Margaret Mahoney reports that according to the results of a 1968 survey by the American Council on Education, a majority of our students go to college to acquire a marketable skill and to make friends; few of them see the arts as related to these goals. It was also interesting to note that over two-thirds of the freshmen surveyed stated that one of their reasons for going to college was to seek a philosophy of life, and yet relatively few students, in proportion to those who as freshmen stated such a goal, enrolled in fine arts courses during their four years of study.[4] One cannot avoid speculating at this point on the influence or the substance of the counseling provided these entering freshmen. Additionally, some alumni of these institutions are only mildly enthusiastic toward the arts in the curriculum. Morrison cites another study by the American Council on Education, the 1971 *American Graduate Students: A Normative Description*, which revealed that the majority of post-secondary graduates thought it fairly unimportant to have a firm undergraduate foundation in the fields of art and music.[5]

Given this background, it is difficult to focus on the constituency that may be responsible in the coming decade for the advancement of the arts in the curriculum. Roger

Mandle, director of The Toledo Museum of Art, has stated that individuals associated with the arts like to reassure themselves that these arts play an important civilizing role in higher education.[6] Many would agree; but we in the arts who have been an integral part of their advancement in our society will have to assume more than a passive attitude toward our responsibilities in the total scheme of future educational considerations. We cannot continue to reassure ourselves that the civilizing role of the arts will automatically defend their position in the postsecondary educational community. What we can expect is that the decision makers will demand an even more exact accounting for the *raison d'etre* of the fine arts' mission and that the survival and advancement of the arts on our campuses may be dependent primarily, as in the 1960's, upon institutional leadership of exceptional vision. In an attempt, therefore, to anticipate the changes that may have an impact on the course of educational philosophy in the future, we need to focus on some of the critical issues currently facing administrators of higher education.

The academic community has marketed itself over the past decades as having the ability to provide a comprehensive educational background for meeting the needs of the individual and of society as a whole. Its campuses are reputed to offer a conducive climate for research, public service, and a multitude of worthy activities designed to equip its participants for a productive life in a democratic society. Those in the community pride themselves in their efforts to address social concerns of local, state, and national importance. Lifelong learning, quality of life, human values and ethics have become the "hot topics" of conversation in recent years. Numerous conferences and seminars held over the past months as well as volumes of printed material generated by our most esteemed critics, bear testimony to the focus of interest in this latest thematic material. While we applaud the activity, some members of the academy are forced to admit that these new issues do not really constitute fresh educational platforms but are simply the reflections of commitments that at one time occupied the very heart of educational pursuit.

Intermingled with quality of life issues, there are for

those in higher education at the state, national, and institutional administrative levels obligations involving the more pragmatic concerns of accessibility, availability, and accountability. Resources and facilities acquired over the years have expanded at a tremendous rate in order to accommodate an elevation of social consciousness which dictated that all those wishing to avail themselves of, and could benefit from, the opportunities provided by our system of higher education could do so regardless of race, sex, social background, or physical limitations. Our lofty ambitions have been costly, and predictions for the maintenance of this vast system of educational opportunity over the next decade appear to be more often bleak than encouraging. Increased inflation and expenditures for the support of higher education, coupled with anticipated declines in student enrollments and shrinking budgets, have caused all but the most naive to take a hard-nosed look at what the educational system is providing, what it will be willing to provide in the future, and who should be willing to bear the cost.

Although some still refuse to join the ranks of the "prophets of doom" or to formulate yet another scenario of catastrophe, all are forced to admit that stern realities must be faced if the academy is to continue to be productive in the midst of diminishing resources. The need for expansion has ceased, and it is time to reflect upon new directions. Curriculum planning and development will become a matter of paramount concern, and a determination will be made as to whether the fine arts will be supported as a vital part of the curriculum or relegated to a position of an "expendable and isolatable luxury commodity."[7] We in the fine arts need to put our house in order and frankly examine our purposes if we are to contribute to maintaining the vitality and viability of the arts in higher education.

A valuable overview of the commonly acknowledged rationale for the existence of and continued support for the fine arts was presented by Roger Mandle in his April, 1979, address at The University of Toledo. In a hierarchical arrangement of values, he pointed to the commercial value of art, the social prestige its acquisition at times insures, and its

77

study as an interpreter of history. The arts were acknowledged as a vehicle for the study of aesthetics and for their absolute value. Since this rationale for the preservation of the arts in society has strong implications for the support and advancement of the fine arts in higher education, it is my intention to elaborate briefly on Mr. Mandle's observations, to give visibility to some of the opposing and contrasting points of view related to these values, and to explore some other paths of learning which can be enhanced through the study of arts. My remarks will refer not only to the visual arts, but also to other creative and fine arts, namely music, dance, and drama.

There are not many who would debate the commercial value of art and the attendant social prestige the products of artists bestow upon their supporters. Today's large corporations have replaced the Medici's as the arts' contemporary philanthropists. They have become not only the avid supporters of the performing arts, but have also acquired handsome collections of paintings, sculpture, and other *objects d'arts*. Private collectors continue to be the benefactors of our museums, and wealthy patrons have been responsible for building and subsidizing our arts centers and programs.

Since historically the arts have been supported by the learned class of society, the relationship of the commercial and social values of the arts to higher education is reasonably clear. It was the aristocracy who had the educated sensibilities to appreciate the arts and the leisure time to pursue them. In a sense, our present educational system has capitalized on an elitist philosophy by including within faculty ranks artists-in-residence and by budgeting for the continuing support of performing ensembles and university museums. The artists and museums in turn lend considerable prestige to the academy while at the same time contributing to the education of tomorrow's professionals and teachers.

There is some merit in this exchange, but its value to the future development of the arts in higher education is limited. Relegated to this role, the arts will continue to be little more than an extension of the entertainment industry and will

continue to remain on the periphery of serious educational consideration. It should be pointed out that one reason for this is that the arts are not dependent upon higher education for the training of its professionals. Many private institutes and academies perform the same function, and there are those, such as the artist Ben Shahn, who seriously question whether a high calibre of professional training can be achieved in a climate of detachment which so often characterizes universities and colleges. As James Thrall Soby points out, it was a fundamental aspect of Shahn's philosophy that total withdrawal from the contemporary scene usually brought about art's suicide, a philosophy clearly revealed when Shahn spoke of Goya:

> I am plagued by the exasperating notion: What if Goya, for instance, had been granted a Guggenheim, and then, completing that, had stepped into a respectable and cozy teaching job in some small — but advanced! — New England college, and had thus been spared the agonies of the Spanish Insurrection? The unavoidable conclusion is that we would never have had "Los Caprichos" or "Los Desastres de la Guerra." The world would not have been called upon to mourn for the tortured woman of the drawing inscribed "Because She Was a Liberal!" Nor would it have been stirred by Goya's pained cry, "Everywhere It Is The Same!" Neither would it have been shocked by his cruel depictions of human bestiality, nor warned — so graphically, so unforgetably — that fanaticism is man's most abominable trait.[8]

The historical value of art is easily documented and its relevance to higher education readily understood. Musical iconography, for example, has been recognized as a valuable tool for today's musicologists in their research of ancient musical instruments and performance practices; frescos and murals reveal the character of their eras; and dramas and theatrical production have been a source of historical thought. On the other hand, Barbara Hampton Renton cites the hazards encountered in taking musical iconography too

seriously,[9] and Dorothy Walsh reminds us that the accuracy of the information conveyed through art was always suspect, for artists, in capturing history, were not photographers of events but used their mediums as vehicles of expression.[10] Rollo May also warns that artists were not didactic but sought instead to interpret through their compositions the essence of art as the powerful and alive encounter between themselves and their worlds.[11]

While the commercial, social, and historical values of art are certainly relevant to higher education and provide a rationale for their continued support, the vision of arts on campus must be expanded beyond the perspectives embodied in these values. The arts will reach their greatest potential within the academic community only if the understanding of their aesthetic value, their value as a source of intuitive or expressive knowledge, is perceived.[12] The importance of expressive knowledge is dramatically illustrated in a conversation reputed to have taken place between the 19th Century painter Georges Vibert and Degas. It seems that Vibert, in extending to Degas an invitation to attend an exhibition of water colors, said to him: "You may find our frames and rugs a little too fancy for you, but art is always a luxury, isn't it?" To this Degas replied, "Yours may be, but mine is an absolute necessity."

In his paper, Roger Mandle touched on this concept of the absolute necessity of art when he discussed art as ultimately a virtue in and for itself. The absolute value of art and the "art for art's sake doctrine" is, however, rather unpopular today for it suggests an ivory tower philosophy that we in education tend to avoid. Yet it is impossible to ignore the existence of art and the fact that there is a power in its essence that exists in and of itself. This power, in my opinion, is related to the language of the arts, a language which is international and metaphysical, and which, with the exception of linguistic art forms, needs no translation in order to be understood.

The arts are vehicles of nonverbal communication, a communication that at times has the ability to clarify and

define concepts in more graphic terminology than words. Musical compositions and works of contemporay visual artists such as Jackson Pollock demonstrate this type of communication most vividly. Ann Jarmusch quotes Pollack: "The modern artist is living in a mechanical age and we have a mechanical way of representing objects in nature such as the camera and photograph. The modern artist, it seems to me, is working and expressing an inner world — in other words — expressing the energy, the motion, and other inner forces."[13]

Ultimately, of course, it is impossible to comprehend this language and the essence of the absolute value of art if one is not comfortable with the aesthetic process of the creative act. Roger Mandle points to the aesthetic value of art as being the wrestling ground of philosophers, and so it is. But if we are to fully understand the essence and power of artistic imagination and expression and, after understanding it, orchestrate this power throughout our higher education system, we must be willing to share this arena with the philosophers, unfamiliar though it may be.

Our world is one of complexity and change, but higher education, successful as it has been in producing skilled and well-informed specialists, has not been able, according to Earl McGrath, to produce a citizenry sufficiently informed about the universe in which it lives to react constructively to the personal and civic problems confronting it.[14] Education in the formal sense has been too often narrowly defined and limited in scope. A rigidity of thinking among faculty members and administrators, too long protected from external interference, has ossified the educational process rendering it ineffective in a climate of organized impermanence such as that which pervades contemporary society. Our scholars acknowledge that solutions relevant to today's needs will be outmoded tomorrow, and yet educators have been content to design curriculums which emphasize the instruction of skills and facts rather than creative processes which may lead to new paths of discovery. John Gardner points out there is not only a pressing need to differentiate between training and education in the coming decade, but there is also a need to rediscover the educational process in its broader and more mean-

ingful scope, a process that addresses not only the intellect but the emotions, one that involves not only techniques and skills but one's moral and spiritual growth.[15]

Within a broader educational context, one may justly question the ability of the arts to speak to complex issues, to promote a heightened sense of awareness to social and ethical values, or to prepare one for living in a changing environment. The answer to the question may be found in differentiating between the art product and the art process, while at the same time recognizing that the two are not really separable.

The products of creativity, for example, drama, paintings, and poetry, have made a significant contribution as commentaries on social and moral issues. The sensitivity of Elizabeth Barrett Browning to child labor conditions in the early nineteenth century prompted the writing of the poignant and descriptive, "The Cry of the Children." An expression of anquish and bitterness toward the ravages of war is depicted in the paintings of Goya, Picasso, and Shahn. Samuel Beckett's play *Waiting for Godot* is a stark commentary on the plight of modern man's inability to communicate.

Although the art product has been effective as a commentator on social injustices, it can only indirectly influence moral and social behavior. To say otherwise would not only be arrogant but unrealistic. Sidney Zink claims that if moral potentialities can be attributed to the arts, they are greatest in tragedy and limited to dramatic literature;[16] and Jacob Burckhardt, in his celebrated work *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, cautions us:

> The relation of the individual nations to the highest things of life, to God, virtue, and immortality, may be investigated up to a certain point, but a strict parallel cannot be drawn. In fact, the more distinctly our evidence in these matters seems to speak, the more we must be on our guard against rash generalizations.[17]

To uncover the arts' primary and more profound function in a

broader educational context, it becomes imperative, then, to look beyond the art product to the creative process, a process that develops and expands levels of awareness, appreciation, and sensitivity to complex issues.

Familiarity with this creative process will ultimately direct one's attention to that which is not readily apparent. The development of ear and eye to interpret experiences of hearing and seeing equips one for an inward journey, the purpose of which is to search for knowledge apart from that which is transmitted through external means or that which is usually taught in the classroom. There are those who postulate that knowledge is acquired solely through the intellect and is devoid of feeling and intuition, but most artists would object. Michaelangelo is reputed to have said that "One paints, not with the hands, but with the brain." Similarly, Leonardo da Vinci emphasized that "all knowledge originates in our sensibilities."[18]

Should the relationship of the arts to intellect and intuition be difficult to grasp, it is, in the words of Albert Christ-Janer and Ralph L. Wickiser, because "the aesthetic state of mind deals with wholes, and because of its process of synthesis it is difficult to enter and maintain. The arts appear to be esoteric, impractical, or superficial. But this can also be said of all complex processes that necessitate penetrating intellectual concentration or any prolonged creative effort demanding sustained attention."[19] The acquisition of facts, therefore, is not enough; one must develop the ability to translate facts into meaning of personal significance.

While science may test certain values, the content of value does not come from science. Knowledge acquired solely through rote-learning of standards, whether heralded by therapists, educational leaders, or civic groups, is likewise insufficient for the understanding of human values and ethics. Rollo May suggests the act of valuing implies a conscious choice, responsibility, and commitment.[20] "Morality," according to Sidney Zink, "is not chiefly an affair of the affirmation of a belief, or the performance of a particular act, or movement by an emotional tendency, but rather is a conscientious-

ness of mind and will in the scrutiny and actualization of values. . . . What chiefly needs moral direction is not the course of behavior so much as the course of thought; and for this, moral questions are more useful than moral answers."[21] Human values must ultimately be perceived from an individualized perspective. That which makes up the whole of human existence can only be comprehended if each one is introduced to, and becomes thoroughly acquainted with, a process that develops and demands the ability to travel inward.

Through an understanding of the creative process, one can become more in tune with the changing environment, become comfortable with it, and eventually be stimulated to participate actively in the change. The creative process embodies this principle. Jazz musicians, for example, in order to capture the essence of the improvisational style must develop the ability to conceptualize endless variation. Although technological advances have enabled us to reproduce music and drama through recordings and film, they have not been able to totally reproduce the artistic event. These media can only capture the fundamentals of the art product. The listener or observer brings to each new viewing or listening experience a fresh approach and in so doing is unable to relive a work in precisely the manner experienced previously. With this active involvement, according to Rollo May, art becomes a moving, constantly changing experience; and the individual, by experiencing some new moment of sensibility or awareness, engages in the creative act.[22]

Our university system has become the central agency for the advancement of knowledge, and the current popular emphasis on lifelong learning has legitimized the continued quest for this knowledge. The continuous learning concept will be rendered meaningless, however, if we attempt to approach it within the traditional instructional system. A concept of education which concentrates primarily on the teaching of a discipline or on preparation for a career is too limited. Education in a broader sense emphasizes the acquisition of intellectual skills that are transferable; it is the process of learning that is vital, not the subject matter. It

seems to me that the credibility of our educational system can only be properly advanced through the establishment of priorities which will enliven and at the same time give balance to the educational process. We must venture beyond the products of our system and search for the hidden dialogues involved in the formation of that product. In order to achieve that end, programs must be developed to speak to the aesthetic and creative needs of all individuals.

The arts can assist in the development of such programs only if we recognize that the central mission of the arts in higher education is not to be viewed primarily as the training of professionals or as the creation of a multitude of products; neither is it to be viewed as the teaching of conventional standards of beauty and harmony. The message of the arts is that the worlds of creativity which are familiar habitats of the creative spirit are accessible to all, not just the dreamers of society. Quality of life issues and a basic commitment to human values can only be realized when the individual is capable of grasping the potential for human accomplishments. The energy and vitality of the arts are linked to the creative process of discovery, the discovery of the world's "beyond," if you will. For it is only when man has the ability to dream of becoming other than what he is that the process is already in place for him to become that which he is not.

NOTES

[1]Jack Morrison, *The Rise of the Arts on the American Campus* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 184.

[2]Lewis B. Mayhew, "The Arts and Access to Higher Education," in *The Arts in Higher Education*, eds. Lawrence E. Dennis and Renate M. Jacob (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1968), pp. 105-106. [The original Rockefeller report is *The Performing Arts: Problems and Prospects* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).]

[3]Roberta Graham, "Business and the Arts Make a Perfect Match," *Nation's Business* 67, no. 4 (April 1978), p. 51.

[4]Margaret Mahoney, "Overview of the Present," in *The Arts on Campus: The Necessity for Change*, ed. Margaret Mahoney (Greenwich, Connecticut: New York Graphic Society, 1970), p. 23.

[5]Morrison, p. 194.

[6]Roger Mandle, "The Fine Arts and Human Values in Higher

Education," in *Higher Education's Cultural Obligations: Views and Reviews*, ed. John Y. Reid (Toledo, Ohio: John H. Russel Center for the Study of Higher Education, The University of Toledo, 1980), p. 59.

7James Ackerman, "Education of Vision," in *The Arts on Campus: The Necessity for Change*, ed. Margaret Mahoney (Greenwich, Connecticut: New York Graphic Society, 1970), p. 68.

8James Thrall Soby, *Ben Shahn Paintings* (New York: George Braziller, 1963), pp. 26-27.

9Barbara Hampton Renton, "Worth a Thousand Words," *College Music Symposium* 19, no. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 246-251.

10Dorothy Walsh, "The Cognitive Content of Art," *The Problems of Aesthetics* (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1955), p. 606.

11Rollo May, *The Courage to Create* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1975, Bantam Edition, 1976), p. 53.

12Benedetto Croce, "Art as Intuition," in *The Problems of Aesthetics*, eds. Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1955), pp. 69, 83 *et passim*.

13Ann Jarmusch, "The Energy (and Agony) of Jackson Pollack," *Realities* (April 1979), p. 40.

14Earl McGrath, *General Education and the Plight of Modern Man* (Indianapolis, Indiana: The Lilly Endowment, Inc.), p. vii.

15John W. Gardner, *Excellence* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 136.

16Sidney Zink, "The Moral Effect of Art," in *The Problems of Aesthetics*, eds. Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1955), p. 560.

17Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (New York: New American Library, 1960), p. 302.

18Edward MacCurdy, ed., *The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci*, Vol. II (New York: Reynal, 1939), p. 67. Cited by Albert Christ-Janer and Ralph L. Wickiser, "Higher Education and the Art," in *The Arts in Higher Education*, eds. Lawrence E. Dennis and Renate M. Jacob (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, 1968), p. 51.

19Albert Christ-Janer and Relph L. Wickiser, "Higher Education and the Arts," in *The Arts in Higher Education*, pp. 48-49.

20Rollo May, *Psychology and the Human Dilemma* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1969), p. 220.

21Zink, p. 556.

22Rollo May, *The Courage to Create*, pp. 15-16.

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